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ABSTRACT
Prices for pharmaceutical products over the last 10 years have skyrocketed,
increasing far more rapidly than the general cost of living. This article argues there
should be greater competition for the production of follow-on drugs through the
strengthening of the double patenting prohibition: preventing extending exclusive rights
beyond the original patent term by dressing up part of that invention as a new one. This
prohibition against the same party holding two patents covering the same composition
announced by the Supreme Court in the 1800’s has been weakened by lower federal
courts to (1) only considering the claims and not the rest of the specification in
determining if the same invention is being claimed by the inventor in two patents and (2)
only applying the prohibition when the earlier patent did not satisfy the technical
meaning of “prior art” within §102 of the Patent Act. The rulings weakening the double
patenting doctrine have disregarded that the “invention” of a genus patent is not
determined only by the claims, but also by the embodiments disclosed in the specification,
and under Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent it must be presumed that the
party with a genus patent has invented the full scope of the genus. These weakening
rulings have also disregarded that the double patenting doctrine arises from §101 of the
patent statutes, rather than §§102 and 103, which the Federal Circuit models it double
patenting test on, often incorrectly concluding there is no double patenting. §§102 and
103 serve different purposes than §101. This article argues that when the same inventor
holds a genus patent for a pharmaceutical product, it should be estopped from obtaining
a patent on a species within the scope of the genus, whether or not the genus patent
constitutes prior art. Applying this strengthened double patenting doctrine would
increase competition for the development of follow-on pharmaceutical products.
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¶2

1850: Samuel Morse “could not take out a subsequent patent for a portion of his
first invention [the telegraph], and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period
limited by law.”1
1894: “[N]o patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent,
especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may differ.”2

1
2

O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1853).
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894).
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INTRODUCTION
¶3

¶4

People who decry the rising prices of their medicines probably do not recognize
one cause of that rise—a relatively obscure patent law doctrine called double patenting.
The double patenting doctrine, which actually prohibits double patenting, should promote
competition for improvements but has often failed. In a series of rulings, the Federal
Circuit has weakened the double patenting doctrine and removed it from its historical
Supreme Court roots. This has allowed pharmaceutical companies to obtain second
patents for compositions covered by their earlier patents and to extend their exclusive
rights in the applicable composition beyond the term permitted for a single patent. The
Supreme Court can and should reinvigorate the double patenting doctrine as a prohibition
on such second patents. This reinvigorated double patenting prohibition will promote
innovation and competition for pharmaceuticals by third parties and limit price gouging
resulting from unjustified extensions of patent rights.
To put this in patent law terms, pharmaceutical companies have been obtaining
broad U.S. patents that cover all compositions containing common elements, a genus, that
sometimes includes millions of compositions.3 As a result, patentees have acquired what
the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized as a right to “cripple competition”4 because a
genus patent gives the holder (a “First Inventor” and the patent a “First Patent”) the right
to exclude for 20 years any other company from making, using, selling or offering to sell
any of those millions of embodiments (a “First Invention”). 5 These patents (1) hinder
others from determining which species within the genus have the most promising medical

3
JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 176 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2012) (“A genus is a grouping
or category made up of multiple species that share some characteristic”); see, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v.
Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 107 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the
genus ‘596 patent covered several million compounds); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d
1280, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the genus ‘416 patent “teaches a broad genus encompassing ‘approximately
nine trillion compounds.’”).
4
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (“Patent holders have a ‘lawful right to
exclude others from the market’. . . ; thus a patent ‘conveys the right to cripple competition.’”) (quoting
FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1310 (2012)).
5
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (post-AIA). Currently the patent term is measured from the earliest effective
filing date of the patent application. Id. Due to the length of time a patent application takes to process, the
average term of a utility patent from the date of its grant is “usually about 17 years.” Mueller, supra note 3,
at 21. Under the Patent Act of 1861, the term of a patent was 17 years from the date of issuance of the
patent. See Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (1861). As a result of the Uruguay Round
Amendments Act (URAA) becoming effective on June 8, 1995, the term of a patent was changed from 17
years from the date of issuance to 20 years from the earliest effective U.S. filing date. Emily A. Evans &
Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 625, 626 (2005).
However, the expiration dates of patents issuing from related patent applications can still differ. See, e.g.,
Dennis Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA?, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/obviousness-patenting-survive.html [https://perma.cc/3MED-A9QG]
(“First, the term of a patent may be adjusted or extended due to a variety of factors with the result that
family member applications may have different expiry dates. The second source of potential termseparation comes from the statutory definitions of prior art that excludes certain prior applicant disclosures
from the scope of prior art.”). The term of a patent is also subject to a number of extensions, discussed in
Part IIB infra.
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properties6 and (2) prevent others from selling such species in competition with the
patentee.7 The First Inventor commonly subsequently obtains a patent for a narrower
composition for a promising commercial product (a “Follow-On Patent” or “Follow-On
Product”) within the scope of the genus.8 This second patent can give the patentee
exclusive rights to that narrower composition extending longer into the future than the
genus patent did and giving the patentee the ability to keep prices above the marginal cost
of production of that invention.9
For instance, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. received a patent in 1988 covering
approximately nine trillion antipsychotic compounds that included aripiprazole and
subsequently obtained a patent expressly claiming aripiprazole, which allowed Otsuka to
extend its exclusive rights in aripiprazole from March 29, 2005 to April 2015.10 In 2001,
AbbVie Inc. received a patent for a broad method of treating rheumatoid arthritis with
methotrexate and an antibody, and in 2010 it received a patent for a narrower method—
within the scope of the original patent—of treating arthritis with methotextrate and an
antibody, allowing AbbVie to extend its exclusive rights to the narrower method from
2012 to 2018.11 A recent study showed that such subsequent patents added 6.3 to 7.4
years of patent life to the original patent.12
6
A “species claim” is a claim theoretically “covering only a single entity.” Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008).
However, in fact, all species claims cover more than one embodiment, where “essentially all patent
claims—not just those defining chemical and biotechnological inventions—are genus claims.” Id. at 1169.
As a result, the term species and genus are relative terms. In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1014 (C.C.P.A.
1964). There is a common law experimental use exemption, but the Federal Circuit narrowly construed that
exemption in Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Mueller, supra note 3, at 535–36;
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
846–47 (6th ed. 2013). In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that it is not an act of infringement to
make a patented invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .” However, the
scope of this regulatory use exemption and the use of patented compositions as research tools is unsettled
after Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005), in which the Supreme Court
expressly declined to express an opinion on whether § 271(e)(1) “exempts from infringement the use of
‘research tools’ in the development of information for the regulatory process.” Id. at 205, n.7. There is
“troubling evidence regarding delays or impediments to scientific research (with concerns appearing much
more pronounced with respect to patented diagnostics) that result from patent licensing costs, licensing
failures, or the chilling effects of uncertain potential liability.” Henrik Holzapfel and Joshua D. Sarnoff, A
Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and Research Tools, 48 IDEA 122, 144 (2008).
7
See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
8
See, e.g., Lisa L. Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make A Drug - Follow-On
Pharmaceutical Patents And University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 301
(2010); and Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex,
63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 276 (2008). Terms other than “Follow-On” commonly used are “evergreening,”
“secondary patents,” and “layering.” See, respectively, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg]; N.
Nicole Stakleff, A Drug Life: The Chemistry Of Patent And Regulatory Exclusivity For Pharmaceuticals,
16 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 27, 54 (2014); Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching The Limits Of Intellectual Property
Rights: Has The Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 248 (2001).
9
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 996 (1997).
10
See infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 454–73 and accompanying text. Professor Love has pointed out that “in practice
follow-on, or ‘secondary,’ pharmaceutical patents are often successfully challenged by generic drug
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The high cost of patented pharmaceutical products has become a national issue,13
and from 2006 to 2013, the price of brand name drugs “climbed about three times faster
than the rate of inflation.”14 Subsequently, the Mayo Clinic and over 100 prominent
oncologists published criticism of the high prices of cancer drugs.15 They noted, “In the
United States, the average price of new cancer drugs increased 5- to 10- fold over 15
years, to more than $100,000 per year in 2012.”16 They argued for “[r]eforming the
patent system to make it more difficult to prolong product exclusivity unnecessarily
(patent ‘evergreening’).”17 Similarly, the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation reported that “most
Americans feel that drug costs are unreasonable (72 percent).”18 The AARP Policy
Institute said, “The gap between brand name drug price increases and the rate of general
inflation has been growing wider over the past few years.”19
Yet higher prices have not resulted in increased innovation. Dr. Marcia Angell,
M.D., the former Editor in Chief of The New England Journal of Medicine, wrote that
companies.” Brian J. Love, Patent Duration, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., Edward Elgar Publishing,
forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642927 [https://perma.cc/8JE5X5XN]. AbbVie’s species patent was successfully challenged on obviousness type double patenting (infra
notes 454–73), but the success of some challengers does not comfort those challengers who were
unsuccessful (e.g., infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text) or the patients who would have liked to
obtain cheaper medicine.
12
Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!):
ONE,
An
Empirical
Analysis
of
“Secondary”
Pharmaceutical
Patents,
PLOS
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0049470 [https://perma.cc/VG3A-VLQV].
This article addresses subsequent patents that fall within the scope of the original genus patents, not other
combinations of patents, such as a composition patent and a subsequent patent for a method of using that
composition and others discussed in the article by Kapczynski, Park and Sampat.
13
See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Lawmakers, Candidates Target High Drug
Prices, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-candidates-target-high-drugprices-1447635567 [https://perma.cc/ZN4Y-JJZZ]. Some of the recent uproar about high prices for
pharmaceutical products have not involved the price of patented drugs at all. See Andrew Pollack, Martin
Shkreli’s Latest Plan to Sharply Raise Drug Price Prompts Outcry (Dec. 11, 2015), N. Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/business/martin-shkrelis-latest-plan-to-sharply-raise-drug-priceprompts-outcry.html [https://perma.cc/HRF7-ULZL].
14
Daniel J. Kevles, Medicare, Medicaid, and Pharmaceuticals: The Price of Innovation, 15 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS (2015). See also Serena Lipski, Excessive Pricing And Pharmaceuticals:
Why The Federal Patent Act Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices, 39 U. TOL. L.
REV. 913, 924 (2008) (“In the more than two decades that have passed since the Hatch-Waxman Act, there
have been dramatic price increases in the cost of pharmaceutical drugs.”).
15
Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y. TIMES (July 23,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drug-companies-pushed-from-far-and-wide-toexplain-high-prices.html [https://perma.cc/KM39-UJSU]; Mayo Clinic, In Support of a Patient-Driven
Initiative
and
Petition
to
Lower
the
High
Price
of
Cancer
Drugs,
http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(15)00430-9/fulltext
[https://perma.cc/Q6476KX6] [hereinafter Mayo Clinic].
16
Mayo Clinic, supra note 15, at 2.
17
Id. at 2–3.
18
Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 2015, http://kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-healthtracking-poll-august-2015/ [https://perma.cc/K6Z8-L3MT] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
19
Stephen W. Schondelmeyer & Leigh Purvis, Rx Price Watch Report, November 2014, Trends In
Retail Prices Of Brand Name Prescription Drugs Widely Used By Older Americans, 2006 to 2013, 16
(2014),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/rx-price-watch-report-AARP-ppi-health-nov14.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA96-M4ST].
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“the pharmaceutical industry is not especially innovative” and added that from 1998
through 2002, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 415 new drugs, but
only 14 percent were “truly innovative.”20 In 2012, the President’s Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology said that “the pace of new therapeutic development has not
kept up with the explosion in scientific knowledge” and observed, “The number of novel
drugs has remained constant for several decades, even as R&D budgets have substantially
increased.”21 In 2015 the FDA reported that “rising research and development (R&D)
expenditures are not being matched by a proportionate discovery of innovative
medicines.”22
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said in a 1954 sermon that “if we are to make this a
better world in which to live, we’ve got to go back. We’ve got to rediscover these
precious values that we’ve left behind.”23 This article argues that the Federal Circuit
needs to rediscover the still-valid principles and values expressed in Supreme Court
decisions in the 1800s that an inventor “could not take out a subsequent patent for a
portion of his first invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period limited
by law”24 and that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former
patent, especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may differ.”25
Similarly in 1896 in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,26 the Supreme Court said, “It is
self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist,
and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.
It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”27 These still-valid principles28 reflect
this country’s “historical antipathy to monopoly.”29

20
MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
21
Exec. Office of the President, President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Report to the
President on Propelling Innovation in Drug Discovery, Development, and Evaluation (Sept. 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-fda-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2SS6BUJ].
22
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Targeted Drug Development: Why Are Many Diseases Lagging
Behind?, 1 (July 2015), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/ucm454955.htm
[https://perma.cc/TS9J-8UEN]; cf. Joseph Walker, Patients Struggle With High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J.
(Jan.
2,
2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices-1451557981
[https://perma.cc/KGL9-TXMX] (“The Food and Drug Administration approved 41 new drugs in 2014, the
most in nearly two decades. The catch is their cost.”).
23
Martin Luther King, Jr., February 28, 1954: Rediscovering Lost Values, KING INST. ENCYCL.,
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_rediscovering_lost_values/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/2MDP-PE3X].
24
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. at 114.
25
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. at 198.
26
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
27
Id. at 185.
28
See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012)
[hereinafter Mayo] (relying on Morse); AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of
Rheumatology Tr., 764 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (relying on Miller and quoting Singer as
reaffirming the prohibition on double patenting, “It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”)
29
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitrom Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972).
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This article argues that what the Federal Circuit calls the double patenting doctrine
is an emaciated version of the balanced principles announced by the Supreme Court in
the second half of the nineteenth century. Contrary to the current Federal Circuit
standard, when an inventor or her employer30 receives a genus patent for a
pharmaceutical composition, that inventor and her employer should not then obtain a
subsequent patent for a composition of matter within the scope of the genus. Such grant
extends the period of exclusive right in the composition of matter beyond that authorized
by statute and is inconsistent with the representation the applicant made when she
acquired the genus patent—that she had invented all compositions of matter within the
genus.31
In contrast, a third party who has not already received or applied for a patent for
subject matter covered by the First Patent has not claimed to have invented the genus.
The principles in Morse, Miller and Singer quoted above32 should not apply in the same
way to a third party claiming subject matter within the scope of the First Patent granted to
the First Inventor. There is no danger that the third party will extend exclusive rights
(since he does not yet have any exclusive rights) beyond his existing patent term. The
same principles also should not apply to the First Inventor if he applies for a patent
covering subject matter not within the scope of his genus patent, because again there is no
danger that he will extend exclusive rights he already has beyond the initial patent term.
Part II discusses the U.S. patent law foundations of balancing the grant of exclusive
rights with promoting competition and the additional statutory benefits already provided
to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part II argues that overly broad genus patents and
Follow-On Patents to the First Inventor tip the balance by restricting third-party
competition for improvements.
Part III explains that the “invention” has never depended solely on what the skilled
draftsman claimed,33 but took into account the invention disclosed in the specification of
the patent application. Part III points out that this concept of invention remains true today
and that the written description requirement of § 112 limits the scope of a genus patent to
no more than the embodiments of the invention disclosed in the specification and
includes each embodiment covered by a patent claim. Although the recent decisions
discussed in this part indicate that many broad genus patents that were granted in the past
would—if submitted today—be held invalid, that does not resolve how courts should
react to applications by an inventor for a patent on a species within the scope of a genus
patent that was granted to that inventor in the past or will be granted in the future.
Part IV addresses that question and argues that the Federal Circuit has improperly
limited double patenting by determining the inventions involved through comparison
only of the patents’ claims and not of their specifications.34 Part IV argues that courts

30
Pharmaceutical companies typically have agreements with their research scientists to assign any
inventions the scientists develop to the pharmaceutical companies. See infra note 336.
31
See 35 U.S.C. § 115; infra note 218 and accompanying text.
32
See supra notes 1, 2, 26–27 and accompanying text.
33
On a number of occasions the Supreme Court has cautioned against allowing patent eligibility to
depend on the draftsman’s art. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014); Mayo;
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
34
Technically, the claims are part of and are found at the end of the specification. See 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA); 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (post-AIA); Oskar Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L.
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should determine the “invention” in double patenting cases in the same way that
“invention” is determined under § 112 and § 271(a): by determining the scope of
embodiments of the claimed invention disclosed in the specification. It analyses
inconsistent decisions by earlier courts and the Federal Circuit on double patenting under
35 U.S.C. § 101.35 It argues that when a First Inventor36 obtains a genus patent, since that
patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282,37 the First Inventor should not be able to
obtain a subsequent patent on a species within the genus by arguing that the First
Inventor had not really contemplated the scope of its genus invention at the time of the
genus application.
¶14
Part V discusses the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which changes the
definition of “prior art” for patents whose effective filing date is on or after March 16,
2013.38 Part V points out that statutory exemptions from treating collaborative research as
prior art —culminating with the passage of the AIA—increases the need for a strong
double patenting prohibition as AIA litigation starts to predominate.39
¶15
Part VI concludes that the double patenting prohibition urged in this article is an
important tool for promoting competition in pharmaceutical products and consumer
access to pharmaceutical products at reasonable prices. Part VI also suggests additional
research is needed to determine whether this article’s arguments about double patenting
should similarly apply to anticipation arguments under § 102 when the genus patent is
prior art to a subsequent species patent to the same inventor.

REV. 57, 66 (2012) (“claim language is part of the specification”). For clarity, when this article refers to the
specification, it means the part of the specification other than the claims.
35
Compare Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) with AbbVie
Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Tr., 764 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
36
See discussion infra, Part IVB3, on the required relationship between the holders of the two
patents, or a patent and patent application, for the double patenting prohibition to apply.
37
The presumption requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut. See infra note 217. Under the
AIA there are methods to challenge the validity of granted patents in administrative proceedings that only
require a preponderance of the evidence to succeed. See. e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e) (inter partes review),
326(e) (post-grant proceedings).
38
See § 3(n) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codifying scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) enacting and setting the date for new 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 102 and
103 to apply generally to “any application for patent, and to any patent issuing thereon, that contains or
contained at any time . . . a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date . . . that is on or
after” March 16, 2013. Mueller, supra note 3, at 208, 233. Mueller writes, “A most unfortunate aspect of
the AIA is that Congress entirely rewrote key statutory provisions of the Patent Act without renumbering
many of the statutory sections in Title 35, U.S.C.” Id. at 234. As a result, “U.S. Patent law will operate on
a dual framework of pre- and post-AIA rules for at least 30 years following the AIA’s enactment.” Id. at
173–74. To avoid confusion, and following one of Mueller’s recommended practices when this article is
referring to § 101, § 102 or § 103, it provides after the citation “(pre-AIA)” when it is referring to situations
in which pre-AIA law is applicable and “(post-AIA)” when it is referring to situations in which the AIA is
applicable. Id. at 235.
39
Professor Crouch reported on September 14, 2015, “Although there are no several thousand
AIA patents issued, there have been no court cases yet involving an AIA patent or patent application.”
Dennis Crouch, Implementing the AIA: First to File Patents, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/09/implementing-first-patents.html [https://perma.cc/6MCM-G4E8].
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I. PATENT LAW SHOULD PROMOTE COMPETITION AMONG INVENTORS FOR FOLLOW-ON
PRODUCTS
A.

Patent Law Balance

¶16

The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to pass patent statutes to promote the
progress of the “useful arts,”40 a reference to engineering, mechanics, and applied
science.41 The Supreme Court has recognized that a patent is an “inducement . . . to bring
forth new knowledge.”42 Scholars agree that patents provide a necessary incentive to
invent, since otherwise “inventors would be unable to recoup . . . their research and
development costs because third parties could simply copy the invention and compete
with the inventor unencumbered by the need to recover fixed costs.”43 However, the fact
that patent protection may be necessary to give companies the incentives to invest
hundreds of millions of dollars44 does not determine the proper recipients or scope of the
incentives.
¶17
In addition to providing incentives, “one of the purposes of the patent system is to
encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions,”45 such
as “disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to
practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired.”46 The Supreme
Court has explained, “The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of
the right to exclude.’”47 Scholars have pointed out that the quid pro quo theory is in
tension with the incentive theory, since disclosures encourage competition for
improvements and weaken the incentives for the First Inventor.48 However, as discussed
below, this tension reflects the need for patent law to reflect a balance between
incentives, access to information, and competition.

40
The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 8 (capitalization in original). See EDWARD
C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1793-1836 19 (1998).
41
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT –
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 120 (2012) [hereinafter Bohannan/Hovenkamp].
42
Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
43
CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 33 (3d ed. 2014).
44
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3
(2009); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) (“the strongest case for patents in something like their present
form is said to be found in a subset of the drug industry.”); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE,
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 212 (2010) [hereinafter Boldrin/Levine] (“the best case for the
existence of patents is in the pharmaceutical industry”).
45
Brenner v. Manson, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 1041 (1966).
46
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
47
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).
48
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 133–34 (Winter 2006)
(“The quid pro quo view of the patent system, therefore, contemplates at least a limited form of free-riding;
the competitor may be able to use the patent disclosure to create the incremental innovation at a lower cost
than discovering the invention independently.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004).
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The Supreme Court has cautioned that “in rewarding useful invention, the rights
and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.”49 The
Court has also recognized the “restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly”50 and
has explained, “The inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out those
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”51
The Supreme Court has concluded that patent “protection strikes a delicate balance
between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”52
Writing for a unanimous Court in 1989, Justice O’Connor said, “From their inception, the
federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both
necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”53
¶19
Scholars have similarly discussed the importance of balance in patent law.54 In their
seminal article on patent scope, Professors Merges and Nelson pointed out that what
constitutes an incentive for some, “such as extension of an initial patent to cover
subsequently-developed versions of the invention,”55 may have the opposite effect on
others. They concluded, “When a broad patent is granted or expanded via the doctrine of
equivalents, its scope diminishes incentives for others to stay in the invention game,
compared again with a patent whose claims are trimmed more closely to the inventor's
actual results.”56 Genus patent claims57 are a choice of the patent applicant, and

49

Sears and Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964).
Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
51
Id.
52
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)).
53
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (striking down a
Florida statute that prohibited the use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls); see
also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973) (“Congress had balanced the need to encourage
innovation and originality of invention against the need to insure competition in the sale of identical or
substantially identical products.”).
54
Not all scholars are in agreement. For instance, Professor Kitch, in his “prospect theory,” and
other scholars have argued that “broad patent rights are beneficial because they encourage patent owners to
explore, improve, and commercialize undeveloped areas of the inventive space fenced in by their claims.”
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 412 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter
Love/Interring]. Professor Love explains, “Prospect theory thus suggests that innovation is optimally
incentivized when a single entity is vested early on with broad patent rights that allow it to control an entire
technological field.” Id. at 414. However, the prospect theory seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court
decisions in Morse (see infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text); Consolidated Electric (see infra note
154–57 and accompanying text); Schriber-Schroth (see infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text); and
with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariad (see infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text) tying the
permitted scope of a claim to what the applicant disclosed in the specification. The Supreme Court has
never adopted the prospect theory, and in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1991), the Court held that a
patent “is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” Id. at 536.
55
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990) [hereinafter Merges/Nelson].
56
Id. at 916. The doctrine of equivalents is a judge-made doctrine intended to prevent defendants
from avoiding a finding of infringement if they make only insubstantial changes in a patented product.
Mueller, supra note 3, at 468–69; see also infra notes 232–39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the impact varying applications of the doctrine of equivalents can have on competition for improvements,
50

327

Vol. 14:3]

Douglas L. Rogers

applicants can write claims that increase or narrow the scope of the exclusionary rights
for the prospective patent application and their effect on others.58
¶20
In weighing that balance, Professor Lemley has argued that patent laws can be
justified “only to the extent that they do on balance encourage enough creation and
dissemination of new works to offset those costs.”59 Professor Nichols has argued that
“the social value of competition may outweigh the social value that can be achieved from
a monopoly drug product alone…. We have a compelling social interest in promoting
competition as well as innovation.”60
¶21
The next section shows that Congress has provided—through statutes and grants —
huge incentives for pharmaceutical inventions, including extending the term of patents
for commercial products, so that already the “incentive to extend the patent life of brand
name drugs is overwhelming.”61
B.
¶22

Additional Benefits to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers62

The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 authorized universities to patent their discoveries
resulting from federal funding, subject to certain rights of the Federal Government.63 The
Bayh-Dole Act provides, among other things, that it is the “policy and objective of the
Congress. . . to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small
business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise.”64
Professor Ouellette argues, “To justify granting these private patent rights for
government-sponsored inventions, one cannot use the typical innovation incentive of
patents, because academic researchers have been innovating long before the Bayh-Dole
Act and are primarily motivated by a desire for prestige.”65 She concludes, “Bayh-Dole
patents typically are justified under commercialization theory—the idea that companies
need exclusive patent rights to bring an invention to market.”66
see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
39–45 (2009).
57
Supra notes 3 and 6. This article uses genus and species in their relative senses, so when
referring to a species in this article, that species could in fact be a genus to some other smaller set of
species.
58
See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“A skilled patent drafter, however, might fashion a claim to cover the metabolite in a way that avoids
anticipation. For example, the metabolite may be claimed . . . as a pharmaceutical composition (e.g., with a
pharmaceutically acceptable carrier). The patent drafter could also claim a method of administering the
metabolite or the corresponding pharmaceutical composition.”).
59
Lemley/Economics, supra note 9, at 997.
60
Len M. Nichols, What Price Should We Pay for Specialty Drugs, Center for Health Policy
Research and Ethics Issue Brief #3, 5 (May 15, 2015).
61
Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching The Limits Of Intellectual Property Rights: Has The
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232 (2001).
62
The three sets of benefits discussed here are not the exclusive ones. For instance, the 1983
Orphan Drug Act “includes certain tax incentives, clinical as well as R&D subsidies, fast-track approval,
along with strong intellectual and marketing rights for products developed for treating rare conditions.”
MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE 82 (2014).
63
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
64
35 U.S.C. § 200.
65
Ouellette, supra note 8, at 307.
66
Id. See also, Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.

328

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

2017

¶23

The Federal Government has also provided significant funding and tax incentives
for pharmaceutical research. For instance, the National Institute of Health (NIH) has
provided the biotech sector $624 billion in research funding: “Through a system of nearly
50,000 competitive grants, the NIH supports more than 325,000 researchers at over 3,000
universities, medical schools, and other research institutions in every US state and
throughout the world . . . traces of government support can also be seen in almost every
single major biopharmaceutical product in the USA.”67
¶24
In addition, through the adoption of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act), 68 the federal
government took affirmative steps to further the commercialization of pharmaceutical
products. Hatch-Waxman allows: (1) generic manufacturers to test but not market their
generic products while the patents for the patented products are still in force, (2) generic
manufacturers to rely on the safety/efficacy studies the manufacturer of the patented
product had provided to the FDA,69 and (3) manufacturers of new chemical entities five
years of “data exclusivity” generally.70
¶25
Under Hatch-Waxman, moreover, Congress has authorized the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) to administratively extend the term of a “patent which claims
a product” if a number of conditions are satisfied.71 One condition is that the term of the
patent must not have been previously extended under § 156(e)(1).72 As a result, “where a
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 621 (2008); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 77, 97–98 (1999).
67
Mazzucato, supra note 62, at 60–61; see also Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off?
Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE
J.L. & TECH., 285, 287, n.1 (2014) (“about two-thirds of university research funding comes from the federal
government”); William Lazonick, & Oner Tulum, US Biopharmaceutical Finance and the Sustainability of
the Biotech Business Model, 40 RES. POL’Y 8–12 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257932.
68
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). Professors Eisenberg and Crane have discussed in
detail how the Hatch-Waxman Act intertwined the benefits of patent and FDA law and promoted the
development of generic pharmaceuticals, while also giving benefits to patented pharmaceuticals. Rebecca
S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the HatchWaxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 206–11 (2015).
For additional discussions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, see Ouellette, supra note 8, at 304–06; and Furrow,
supra note 8, at 284–87.
69
MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE, UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND
PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 111–12 (4th ed. 2013).
70

Id. at 100; Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 261 (2013)( “Hatch-Wax provides a five year period of
data exclusivity for new drugs.”); see also Brian J. Love, Patent Duration, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

(Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds.,

forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Love/Duration] http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642927 (“for at least some new
drugs, FDA approval occurs so long after patent filing that data exclusivity extends beyond the expiration
of patent rights to the drug”).
71
35 U.S.C. § 156(a). Patent term extension or restoration under § 156 bases the extension of the
patent term on delays in the FDA regulatory process for approving a pharmaceutical product for marketing,
whereas patent term adjustment under § 154 is based on delays of the USPTO in granting the initial patent.
See Mueller, supra note 3, at 22–24.
72
35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(2).
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patent covers more than one drug product, the patent could not be extended for a second
drug product if the patent had already been extended for a first drug product.”73 Another
condition is that the product in question must have been subject to a regulatory review by
the FDA before its commercial marketing or use.74 The total extension can be no longer
than five years, and the period of extension granted—together with the remaining term of
the patent at the time of the extension—may not exceed fourteen years.75
¶26
In short, the patent system and other federal laws provide significant, special
incentives to the pharmaceutical industry not available to other industries. This is relevant
background for considering whether there is the appropriate balance between First
Inventors and other improvers for pharmaceutical products.76 The next section addresses
how the courts have treated patents for improvements by parties unrelated to the First
Inventor (in contrast to improvements by the First Inventor or employer of the First
Inventor) and how that treatment can affect competition.
C.
¶27

Competition for Follow-on Products

Since 1793, Congress has authorized the granting of a patent to whoever invents77
“any new and useful machine, manufacture and composition of matter78 and “any
improvement therein not before known or used . . . .” 79 There was no definition of

73
Paul Burgess and John Lucas, Which Generic Drug Would You Want To Use? The Federal
Circuit’s Interpretation Of ‘Active Ingredient,’ ‘Active Moiety’ And ‘Approved Product, 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 14 (2005).
74
35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4).
75
35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(b) and 156(c)(3). Since its adoption, “the PTO has extended the lives of
over 600 drug patents by an average of about 3.5 years. . . . In rare instances – seven times since 1980 –
Congress has also simply bypassed both mechanisms entirely by passing private laws that extend the life of
particular patents. . . .” Love/Duration, 4. There has been significant controversy over whether the patent
term extension provisions of Hatch-Waxman have been applied appropriately. See, e.g., Kristin E.
Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or Survival of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 247 (2002); Paul Burgess & John Lucas, Which Generic Drug Would You Want to Use? The
Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of ‘Active Ingredient,’ ‘Active Moiety’ and ‘Approved Product’, 87 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11 (2005); Ann Kotze, Reining in Patent Term Extensions for Related
Pharmaceutical Products Post-Photocure and Ortho-McNeil, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1419 (2012).
76
Some think that on balance the system of patents for pharmaceutical products is not useful.
Boldrin/Levine, supra note 44, at 238 (“To argue that the system could be fixed by eliminating patents on
pharmaceuticals would be foolish . . . . Far from encouraging great new health and life-saving products, the
system instead produces too much innovation and expense of the wrong kind—me-too drugs to get around
the other guy’s patents.”)
77
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS [hereinafter CHISUM], vol. 9 at app. 10-1. Section 101
provides that whoever “invents or discovers a new and useful . . .” but the Supreme Court has held mere
discoveries are not patentable. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2110 (2013) (“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the §
101 inquiry”).
78
Under the Patent Act of 1790, the comparable words were “manufacture, engine, machine, or
device” and the additional category of patentable subject matter was “art.” See CHISUM, supra note 77, at
vol. 9, app. 9-1. “Art” was used instead of “process” until the Patent Act of 1952. Id. at vol. 9, app. 19-22.
79
Id. at vol. 9, app. 10-1. Section 101 currently provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”
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“improvement” in the 1793 statute, and still is no statutory definition of improvement.80
However, since § 101 ends with the statement, “subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title,” there is no implication in the statute that any inventor has a
right to a patent for any improvement.
In one sense, all patents are for improvements over what existed in prior art, so
“improvement” is really a relative term referring chronologically to what came after some
other invention and was related to that earlier invention.81 Since “the patent grant is a
right to exclude, not an affirmative right to practice an invention,” there is no necessary
inconsistency between granting a patent to one inventor for a First Invention and then
granting a different party a patent for an improvement to the First Invention. 82 But if
patents are granted for both, what are the relative rights of the two patent holders?
Professor Duffy suggested a policy basis for treating First Inventors differently than
other individuals trying to improve on a First Invention.83 He said that “the existence of
the earlier patent affords the pioneer patentee a fairly strong incentive to develop
improvements that increase the market for the technology.”84 He added, “This
“consideration tends to suggest that the patentability standard should perhaps be more
stringent, because the reward of the second patent may be unnecessary to encourage the
pioneering patentee to develop the improvement.”85
An additional reason for differentiating between First Inventors and unrelated third
party improvers in the grant of patents for further improvements is that the First Inventor
has already submitted an oath to the USPTO under §115 that he has invented the genus,
which includes all species within the genus. In Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory,86
Justice Story said, the first patent could be “an estoppel to any future patent for the same
invention” by the same inventor.87 In contrast, the unrelated third party improver has not
submitted any such oath, so is not faced with an estoppel argument that he had already
claimed he had invented the species within the genus.
Professors Bohannon and Hovenkamp noted that there are at least three ways to
address the rights of a First Inventor and a third party who invented an improvement to a

80

See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 9-1; § 100 (pre-AIA); § 100 (post-AIA).
Professor Collins writes, “Technological progress is a cumulative endeavor. The outputs of the
work of earlier generations of inventors are inputs into the work of later generations of inventors. ” Kevin
Emerson Collins, Getting into the ‘Spirit’ of Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Substitute
Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1247 (Spring
2011) [hereinafter Collins]. Professor Merges suggested that technically the only improvement claims are
claims drafted as “Jepson” claims, saying, “Strictly speaking, only a patent drafted in Jepson format is an
improvement patent.” Robert P. Merges, Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents:
Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 878, 879, n.3 (1991) [hereinafter
Merges/Blocking]. See also MPEP § 2929 III, § 608.01(m); 37 C.F.R. 1.75(e); and Merges/Duffy, supra
note 6, at 32. However, Professor Merges and Duffy agree, “Improvements can also be drafted in the
standard format.” Id.
82
Merges/Blocking, supra note 81, at 879, n.2 (1991).
83
John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343 (2008).
84
Id. at 365.
85
Id. He cautioned, however, “The unique aspects of improvement patents seem sufficiently great
as to demand more detailed treatment than can be accomplished in this article.” Id. at 366.
86
18 F. Cas. 578, 2 Mason 28 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1819).
87
Id. at 579.
81
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First Invention (the “Improver”), and those ways affect competition differently. 88 First,
giving the First Inventor exclusive control over all improvements “would completely
undermine anyone else’s incentives to improve the patented technology. It would also
reduce the competitive pressure on the patentee to improve.”89 Second, giving the
Improver exclusive rights to any improvement that independently met patentability
requirements might initially give both the First Inventor and Improver “strong incentives
to improve, but it might make the original patentee’s patent worthless if a market-shifting
improvement were developed.”90 Third, permitting “the patentee to enforce its patent
claims and the improver to enforce any independently patentable claims in its own
patent” would create the possibility of “‘blocking’ patent claims,”91 in which the earlier
patent is called the “dominant” patent and the improvement patent is called the
“subservient” patent.92
¶32
The third alternative above “is closest to the position the law has adopted” with
respect to inventions held by different parties and “may come closest to a proper
allocation of the incentive to develop further technology as between the primary and
subsequent inventors.”93 Reflecting that balance of incentives and competition, § 2 of the
Patent Act of 179394 provided: “any person, who shall have discovered an improvement
in the principle of any machine . . . which shall have been patented, and shall have
obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, use or vend
the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the
improvement….”95 This § 2 clearly referred to the First Inventor and Improver as
different individuals. Congress repealed this § 2 in the Patent Act of 1836,96 but since that
repeal the Supreme Court issued three decisions97 on blocking patents between unrelated
parties, essentially perpetuating judicially the statutory balance adopted in § 2.

88

Bohannan/Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 69.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
91
Id.
92
Merges/Blocking, supra note 81, at 878–79, n.2 (1991).
93
Bohannan/Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 69–70.
94
CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 10. See also Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights
Between Earlier and Later Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 55, 65, n.45 (Fall 2009) [hereinafter Adams].
95
CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 10-1 to 10-2.
96
Act of Feb. 21, ch. 11, 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321, repealed by Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 20, 5 Stat.
117, 125. See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 11-21, § 21; Adams, supra note 94, at 66. While § 2
was still in effect, in Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356 (1822), the Supreme Court addressed a patent claim for
an improvement Evans made in 1873 or 1874 to a machine used in the manufacture of flour called a
Hopperboy. Id. at 357. Evans sued Eaton for infringement, and Eaton defended on the ground that the
Hopperboy was in use prior to 1873, not on the ground of the existence of a blocking patent. Evans v.
Eaton, 8 F.Cas. 856, 857–58 (Cir. Ct. D. Pa.). The Supreme Court said that a patent gives “any inventor of
an improvement in the principle of any machine . . . an exclusive right to a patent for his improvement; but
he is not to be at liberty to use the original discovery, not [sic] is the first inventor at liberty to use the
improvement.” 20 U.S. at 429. The Court rejected the patent claim of Evans, because he was not entitled to
a patent on the whole machine and he had not described his own improvement to only obtain a patent on
the improvement. Id. at 430–32; see also Adams, supra note 94, at 65–66
97
Adams, supra note 94, at 67 (“Besides Cochrane and Cantrell, the Supreme Court has dealt with
the subject of blocking patents in one other case—Temco Electric Co. v. Apco Manufacturing Co.”).
89
90
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In 1876, in the first of the three cases, Cochrane v. Deener,98 the defendants in a
patent infringement suit defended in part on the existence of their own patents in the
manufacture of flour,99 but the Supreme Court dismissed that defense. The Court said that
the only consequence of a blocking patent was “that each inventor is precluded from
using inventions made and patented prior to his own, except by license from the owners
thereof. His invention and his patent are equally entitled to protection from infringement,
as if they were independent of any connection with them.”100
¶34
The second decision, decided in 1886, Cantrell v. Wallick 101 also did not involve
the same party holding or applying for a patent on the First Invention and the
Improvement. Instead, Cantrell involved a patent granted to Wallick for an improvement
in an apparatus for enameling mouldings and a subsequent claim of infringement by
Wallick against Cantrell.102 Robert Marcher had patented an earlier apparatus, and
Cantrell defended on the ground that the Wallick patent was invalid because it embraced
the Marcher patent. 103 The Court rejected that defense, saying, “Two patents may both be
valid when the second is an improvement on the first, in which event, if the second
includes the first, neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other
without the other’s consent.”104
¶35
The third decision, Temco Electric Motor Co. v. APCO Mfg. Co., decided in 1928,
involved a patent held by Temco (the Thomson patent) for a shock absorber for an
automobile 105 and an improved shock absorber made by Apco under a subsequent patent
issued to Storrie.106 Subsequent to its initial patent, Temco developed an improvement in
the shock absorber and applied for a patent on that improvement, which led to an
interference with the Storrie patent to determine who invented that improvement first.107
Storrie, not Temco, was awarded the patent in the interference, so the Supreme Court did
not address whether Temco could have been awarded a separate patent for the
improvement to its earlier shock absorber. 108 The Supreme Court held, “It is well
¶33

98

94 U.S. 780 (1876).
Id. at 782 and 786–87.
Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
101
6 S. Ct. 970 (1886).
102
Id. at 970–71.
103
Id. at 972.
104
Id. at 973. The Court added, “It is only the patentee of the original invention who has the right
to complain of the use made of his invention.” Id.
105
48 S. Ct. 170 (1928).
106
Id. at 171–72. Temco sued Apco for infringement, and Apco defended on the ground of the
Storrie patent, but the Court rejected that defense. Id. at 173.
107
Id. at 172. The Supreme Court described the differences between the claimed inventions of
Temco and Apco as “the substitution of the radius link for the metal guide and casing and hanger” and
added, “Except for the radius link, there is no difference in operation and result.” Id. Interferences were the
pre-AIA procedure for determining which of two competing patent claims for the same invention were
given priority and awarded the patent under the first to invent priority system in place in the United States
before the application of the AIA. Mueller, supra note 3, at 223–25. The AIA “eliminated interferences . . .
but added a new derivation proceeding.” Id. at 220.
108
48 S. Ct. at 172; Apco Mfg. Co. v. Temco Electric Motor Co., 11 F.2d 109 (5th Cir 1926) (“in
an interference proceeding in the Patent Office priority of the conception of the radius link as a part of a
shock absorber adapted to the Ford car was awarded to one Storrie . . .”).
99

100

333

Vol. 14:3]

Douglas L. Rogers

established that an improver cannot appropriate the basic patent of another, and that the
improver without a license is an infringer, and may be sued as such.”109
¶36
None of the three decisions discussed above turned on the same person holding
both patents, and Professor Adams has identified at least three types of improvements
that could lead to blocking patents between unrelated parties.110 The first is “where the
improvement to a prior invention consists of the combination of a component with the
prior invention.”111 The second is if the First Inventor obtained a patent on composition
XYZ, and the Improver subsequently obtained a patent for a new method of using
composition XYZ.112 The third “is when an inventor makes a broad claim to an entire
class (or genus) of products after producing only a single member of the class (or
species).”113 An example of this third type is Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and
Co.,114 which involved “genus claims encompassing the use of all substances that achieve
the desired result of reducing the binding of NF-êB to NF-êB recognition sites.”115
¶37
This third type of a blocking patent – a broad genus patent - can block a significant
amount of competition for improvements by third parties.116 For instance, in Galderma
Laboratories. L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc.,117 the Shroot patents (held by Galderma)118 claimed “a
general chemical formulation that ‘could result in hundreds, if not thousands of different
compounds’ to treat a broad range of diseases,”119 and adapalene was within the range of
alternatives of the Shroot patents.120 The Federal Circuit observed that the “now expired
Shroot patents blocked the market entry of 0.3% adapalene products until their expiration
in 2010, long after Galderma invented 0.3% adapalene compositions of the asserted

109

Id. at 173.
Adams, supra note 94, at 60–64. How to identify blocking patents as a practical matter is not
always clear. See Ian Simmons, Patrick Lynch & Theodore H. Frank, ‘I Know It When I See It’: Defining
and Demonstrating ‘Blocking Patents’,” 16-SUM ANTITRUST 48 (2002) (“What if the second item of
intellectual property theoretically can be practiced without the first, but practicing the second alone would
not be commercially viable?”). Of course, if the two patents are held by the same party, then there is no
blocking, because the holder of one can choose not to exclude itself from practicing the other invention.
111
Adams, supra note 94, at 60.
112
Id. at 61–62
113
Id. at 63–64
114
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010), discussed in more detail in this article infra notes 191-204.
115
Id. at 1340–41.
116
Not only does the patent exclude any other person from making or selling the patented
invention without permission, but, due to the narrow common law experimental use doctrine and limited
statutory exemption under § 271(e), potential competitors are restricted in how they can experiment in
trying to develop alternative products. Supra note 6.
117
Galderma Labs. L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
118
See Br. of Pls.-Appellees, 2013 WL 1333337 at *13 (Fed. Cir.) (“The molecule adapalene was
patented by Galderma in a series of patents (the ‘Shroot’ patents) that first issued in the late 1980s,
including U.S. Patent Nos. 4,717,720 (A13024), 5,098,895 (A13036), and RE 34,440 . . . . These Shroot
patents disclosed an enormous variety of different chemical compounds, different dosage forms, and
different diseases that could be treated by the chemical compounds disclosed therein.”).
119
Galderma, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 603. In other cases, the genus patent has covered millions and
even trillions of embodiments. See supra note 4.
120
The Shroot patents disclosed “adapalene as the active ingredient, in concentrations of 0.001%,
0.1% and 1%” and concentrations “preferably between 0.01 and 1 weight percent.” Galderma, 737 F.3d at
735. See also Galderma, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
110
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claims. As such, no entity other than Galderma could have successfully brought . . . 0.3%
to market prior to 2010.”121
¶38
Scholars generally have agreed that such broad patents restrict competition for
improvements.122 Professors Bohannon and Hovenkamp state, “If IP law prevents
competition by granting rights that are too broad, it discourages competitors from
building on existing ideas, works, and inventions.”123 They argue that people have “a
reduced incentive [to innovate] as it becomes more costly to build on the ideas of
others.”124 Professor Love similarly argued that even in the pharmaceutical and
biomedical industries, “broad pioneer rights are unlikely to spur additional
innovation.”125 He continued, “History further suggests that extending broad patent rights
to early inventors in new fields will generally chill, if not entirely freeze, innovation for
years at a time.”126 Professor Merges and Professor Nelson argued that generally “where
a few organizations controlled the development of a technology, technical advance
appeared sluggish.”127 They concluded, “Without extensively reducing the pioneer’s
incentives, the law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for
improvements, rather than an environment dominated by the pioneer firm.”128
¶39
When a pharmaceutical company faces the argument that its Follow-On Patent
constitutes improper double patenting, the company typically argues that the Follow-On
Patent reflects a different invention than the First Invention and that the Follow-On
Patent was not obvious at the time the company applied for a patent for the First
Invention, disregarding the fact that the genus patent claimed the species disclosed by the
Follow-On Patent.129 This should be a difficult argument for the First Improver to make,

121

737 F.3d at 740. See also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d at 1377.
Professor Lemley has pointed out, “It is not enough to say that intellectual property law favors
‘creators’—for here we have creators on both sides of the equation, and the law must choose between
them.” Lemley/Economics, supra note 9, at 998.
123
Bohannon/Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 273.
124
Id. at 6.
125
Love/Interring, supra note 54, at 446.
126
Id. at 457.
127
Merges, supra note 55, at 908.
128
Id. Innovations exhibiting “extraordinary technological advances” have often been referred to
as “pioneer inventions.” Love, supra note 54, at 381–82. This article does not use the term “pioneer,”
because the dividing line between a pioneer and an another improvement is not always clear. Instead, this
article uses “First Invention” as a term to signify that the invention was invented before a subsequent
invention, with the subsequent invention being an improvement. Historically, when a court found that a
patent was a “pioneer,” it “customarily reward[ed] the inventor with a broad range of equivalents, thereby
permitting her to claim ownership of technology lying substantially beyond the literal scope of her claims.”
Id. at 389. However, the Federal Circuit has issued decisions on pioneer patents that seem to at least be in
tension. Cf. Cohesive Tech., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“pioneering
inventions often, by their very nature, result in broader application of the doctrine of equivalents”); Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“even its ‘pioneer’
status does not change the way infringement is determined”). See also Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future after Festo, 14 FED. CIR. BAR J. 403 (2004). Since this article focuses
on subsequent species claims within the literal scope of an earlier genus claim, there is no need to consider
to what extent a pioneer patent should be given any leeway in determining equivalents. But see Love, supra
note 54, at 379 (“the pioneer doctrine should now be excised from patent law once and for all.”).
129
See, e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text.
122
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in light of its oath or declaration that it had invented the genus130 and in light of the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.131 that an
applicant can only obtain a patent for a genus when he had possessed the full scope of the
invention at the time of the application.132
¶40
Since what “invention” a patent covers is essential to applying the Miller principle
that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent,”133 the next
section examines the meaning of “invention” and the disclosure requirements for a genus
patent.
II. A PATENTEE SHOULD BE BOUND BY ITS OATH
A.

Invention Claimed Cannot Exceed Disclosures in Specification

¶41

Ever since the first U.S. patent statute, an applicant for a patent has had to describe
his invention. Section 2 of that 1790 act provided that the inventor must submit “in
writing . . . a description, accompanied with drafts or models . . . of the thing or things, by
him or them invented or discovered . . . to distinguish the invention or discovery from
other things before known and used…”134 Under the early patent statutes, “Patent claims
were unknown,” and “the jury would determine infringement by determining whether the
defendant’s machines . . . were ‘substantially, in their principles and mode of operation,
like’ . . . the invention described in the patent specification. . .”135 The patent application
described the preferred embodiment of the invention, which was “understood to
encompass all equivalents.”136 Scholars label this practice of claiming as “central
claiming.”137
¶42
After 1822, the U.S. gradually138 switched from central claiming to “peripheral
claiming.”139 In 1836, Congress required that the applicant for a patent “particularly
130

Supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra note 218 and accompanying text.
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text.
133
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894).
134
Section 2 of Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790); CHISUM, supra note
77, at vol. 9, app. 9-1.
135
John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 308 n.108, 309 (2002) (quoting Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814)).
136
Mueller, supra note 3, at 78.
137
Id. at 78; Love, supra note 54, at 389–91. For a detailed history of the transition from central
claiming and the patenting of “principles” to a system of peripheral claiming, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, The
Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y 371, 387–408 (2005).
138
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 734 (2009). It was
only a general, gradual switch because the courts have continued to apply the doctrine of equivalents to
patent claims, and the doctrine of equivalents is a vestige of central claiming. Id. at 735–38. Also, with
means plus function claims, the claims do not provide the outer limits. Id. at 738. See also Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1743, 1771–77 (2009).
139
Fromer, supra note 138, at 734. See also Mueller, supra note 3, at 78. Some say that “patent
drafters began to break out of the text a distinct, separate statement of the novel features of the invention as
a one sentence ‘claim,’ in order to avoid the possibility that the patent might be viewed as intended to claim
everything in the full description of the invention.” Burk, supra note 138, at 1767. Others say the patent
131
132
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specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own
invention or discovery.”140 However, subsequently the Supreme Court still concluded that
the scope of the patent would be determined “with due weight given to the patent’s
written description of the invention and its underlying principles.”141
¶43
The Patent Act of 1870142 mentioned “claim” twice, requiring a patent applicant to
“particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which
he claims as his invention or discovery.”143 Although claims were initially used for
purposes of determining validity of the application, “after some period of time, courts
began employing claims in determining infringement as well.”144 The result of peripheral
claiming was “for claim drafters to attempt to cover, by explicit claim language, every
equivalent that a court might previously have recognized under the doctrine of
equivalents.”145 Three Supreme Court decisions—one before and two after the Patent Act
of 1870—established that the invention disclosed in the specification limited the scope of
a broad patent claim.
¶44
In 1853 in O’Reilly v. Morse,146 the Supreme Court upheld Professor Morse’s
claims to the telegraph and elements of the telegraph, but ruled that his broader eighth
claim was invalid.147 In that eighth claim, Morse said that “the essence of my invention”
was “the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electromagnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or
letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power ….”148 The Court said that
Morse claimed “the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the
electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”149 The Court held that the claim was too broad,
because Morse claimed “an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he
obtained his patent.”150

claim “arose not from any administrative, judicial, or legislative requirement. Instead, it was an innovation
of patent attorneys, and it was formulated to protect and to expand the rights of patentees.” Duffy, supra
note 136, at 309. In any case, the claim distinguished the invention from things previously known and
defined the invention in broad terms to make it more difficult for defendants to argue the products of the
defendant were not equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 309–10
140
Fromer, supra note 138 at 732 (quoting Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat 117, 119); see also
CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 11.
141
Fromer, supra note 138, at 733 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853)).
142
CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 14-6.
143
Fromer, supra note 138, at 734 (quoting “An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the
Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights” § 26, 16 Stat 198, 201 (1870)); see also CHISUM, supra note
77, at vol. 9, app. 14.
144
Burk, supra note 138, at 1769.
145
Id.
146
56 U.S. 62 (1853).
147
Id. at 112.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
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In explaining its holding in Morse, the Supreme Court discussed a subsequent
patent that Morse had obtained for an improvement of local circuits.151 The Court pointed
out that if the eighth claim could be sustained, “his patent for the local circuits would be
illegal and void. For he could not take out a subsequent patent for a portion of his first
invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period limited by law.”152 In
other words, the Court was saying, albeit in dicta, that an inventor could not obtain a
patent on an improvement to a product he had earlier invented, if in fact the inventor’s
original patent was broad enough that it covered the improvement.153

¶46

In 1895, the Supreme Court decided an infringement suit filed by the Consolidated
Electric Light Co. (based on a patent to Sawyer and Man) that nominally was against
McKeesport Light Co., but the “real defendant was the Edison Electric Light
Company.”154 The two broader claims were for incandescing conductors made of
“carbonized fibrous or textile material,” and the narrower third claim was for an
incandescing conductor made of carbonized paper, but it was admitted that the third
claim was not infringed.”155 Expressing concern over the exclusive nature of broad
patents, the Court said “the fact that paper happens to belong to the fibrous kingdom did
not invest them [Sawyer and Man] with sovereignty over this entire kingdom, and
thereby practically limit other experimenters to the domain of minerals.”156
¶47
The Supreme Court rejected the two broader claims of Sawyer and Man in
Consolidated Electric, saying, “If the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile
substances a quality common to them all, or to them generally, as distinguishing them
from other materials, such as minerals, etc., and such quality or characteristic adapted
them peculiarly to incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad.”157 In
other words, since Sawyer and Mann had not invented species beyond the narrower third
claim, the broader claims were invalid.
¶48
In the twentieth century, in Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 158 the
Supreme Court repeated this basic limitation on patent claim scope in a case involving

151
Morse obtained his patent for the telegraph in 1840, and that patent was reissued in 1848. Id. at
106. The patent for the improvement of local circuits was issued in 1846 and reissued in 1848. Id.
152
Id. at 114.
153
Of course, the fact a Supreme Court statement was dicta does not mean it is unimportant. The
Federal Circuit has recognized that subordinate federal courts “are bound to follow them.” Ariad Pharm.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Stone Container Corp. v.
U.S., 229 F.3d 1345, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). See also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809
F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of petition for rehearing en banc). The
Supreme Court has subsequently cited Morse favorably in many decisions. See, e.g., Dolbear v. Am. Bell
Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888) (“The effect of that decision was, therefore, that the use of magnetism as a
motive power, without regard to the particular process with which it was connected in the patent, could not
be claimed, but that its use in that connection could.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
154
Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895). The Court noted that
“the case involved a contest between what are known as the Sawyer and Man and the Edison systems of
electric lighting.”
155
Id. at 468, 472.
156
Id. at 476.
157
Id. at 472.
158
305 U.S. 47 (1938).
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patent claims for automobile pistons.159 The Court reversed the holding of the Sixth
Circuit that the patents were valid160 and said that “the patent monopoly does not extend
beyond the invention described . . . it cannot be enlarged by claims in the patent not
supported by the description.”161
¶49
In other words, even with peripheral claiming, the Supreme Court made clear that if
a patent claim was broader in scope than the invention described in the specification, that
claim was invalid. There was no change as a result of the Patent Act of 1952, discussed
next.
B.

¶50

The Patented Invention is any Embodiment Disclosed in the Specification Within
Scope of Claim162

The Patent Act of 1952 “was intended to recodify, clarify, and revise the 1870
Patent Act’s provisions,” but its “legislative history confirms that no relevant substantive
amendments were intended by the changes to the language of Section 112.”163 Section
112 (pre-AIA) set forth the requirements for describing an invention in a patent
application as follows:
“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same….”; and
“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor
or a joint inventor regards as the invention . . . . ”164

159
Id. at 49. Mueller points out that “the Court in Schriber-Schroth ‘did not expressly state’ that it
was applying a written description requirement separate from enablement,” but “the Ariad court concluded
that ‘that is exactly what the Court did.” Mueller, supra note 3, at 165–66 (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346).
160
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Schriber-Schroth Co., 92 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1937).
161
305 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
162
Professor Liivak explained that “no matter how broadly you might have invented, only the
embodiments that are claimed will need to comply with the validity portions of the patent statute [§§ 101,
102, 103 and 112] and only the claimed embodiments can be infringed.” Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the
Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 31 (2013). However, that disclosure does
not require identification of all the precise chemical structures of each embodiment. See infra notes 202–03
and 213–14 and accompanying text.
163
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future: Part II (1870-1952), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 441, 482, 485 (2005). Professor
Sarnoff also pointed out that in its limited approval of functional claiming in § 112, ¶6, “Congress was
careful to preserve the pre-existing limits on overbroad claiming . . . .” Id. at 486.
164
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1 and 2. Both pre-AIA and post-AIA § 112 contain the clause, “and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”
However, as a result of the AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (b)(3)(A) now provides, “the failure to disclose the best
mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise
unenforceable . . . .”
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¶51

The applicable Senate Report on these two clauses in the 1952 Patent Act said,
“[t]he clause relating to the claim is made a separate paragraph to emphasize the
distinction between the description and the claim or definition, and the language is
modified.”165 Section 112 (post-AIA) has substantially the same provisions for disclosure
as § 112 (pre-AIA).166
¶52
The first paragraph of § 112 provides that the “specification shall contain a written
description of the invention.” In Morse, Consolidated Electric and Schriber-Schroth, with
similar statutory disclosure requirements,167 the Supreme Court concluded that since the
specification did not disclose the scope of what was claimed, the applicable patent claims
were not valid. In other words, “courts must go beyond the claims to determine what the
‘inventors actually invented.”168
¶53
The second paragraph of § 112 mentions “invention,” but simply requires the claim
to reveal what the inventor “regards as the invention.”169 In Morse and Consolidated
Electric, the inventors regarded their inventions as much broader in scope than the
Supreme Court did, but the Court said the actual invention was narrower, as the
specification disclosed. 170 Indeed, § 100(a)(post-AIA) provides, “The term ‘invention’
means invention or discovery,” and § 100(j)(post-AIA) provides, “The term ‘claimed
invention’ means the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or an application for a
patent.” The “claimed invention” can be narrower than the invention disclosed in the
specification, but cannot be broader for patent protection.171
165
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2412 (1952). Before the Patent Act of 1952, the courts had used the
word “invention” to refer to (a) what the inventor had created and also (b) as a “qualitative measure of
patentability for new inventions” that Judge Rich referred to as “judicial legislation.” See Judge Giles S.
Rich, Laying The Ghost Of The ‘Invention’ Requirement, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 29 (2013). The Patent Act of
1952 created a statutory obviousness requirement in § 103 as a substitute for this “judicial legislation” but
retained the requirement in § 112 that the applicant in fact disclose her invention in the patent application.
Id. at 15–18. For detailed discussions of the obviousness requirement, see Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious
Confusion Over Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015) and Douglas
L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test For New Pharmaceutical Compounds: Gobbledygook? 14
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 49 (2015).
166
“(a) In General.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same . . . . (b) Conclusion.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
167
See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 7.02[1]-[4], 7-9 to -12.
168
Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is The “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1879
(2012) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) & Renishaw PLC
v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
169
In addition to adding letter designations to the paragraphs of § 112 (pre-AIA), § 112 (postAIA) added “or joint inventor,” and § 282(b)(3)(A) ()(post-AIA) limited the consequences of failing to
meet the best mode requirement of § 112 (post-AIA). See infra note 184. However, the requirements for
written description, enablement and definiteness remained essentially the same from § 112 (pre-AIA) to §
112 (post-AIA).). See CHISUM, supra note 167, at vol. 3, § 7.02[1]–[5], app. 7-9 to 7-14.1.
170
See supra notes 167 and accompanying text.
171
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 157–60 (2006); cf.
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction in Patent Law, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1102–03 (2011) (“The
specification describes the invention created by the patentee so that others can make and use it . . . a claim
describes only the key inventive features of the invention—those that form the essence of the patentee’s
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¶54

The text of §101 supports the position that “invention” refers to embodiments,
because it provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement” of any of
those categories, is entitled to a patent if the other requirements of the patent statute are
satisfied.172 Machines, manufactures compositions of matter “are real things, as opposed
to metaphysical constructs or abstractions. These things are real in the sense that invented
things are either physical objects (machines, manufactures, compositions of matter) or
they are specific physical acts (processes and methods).”173 In In re Nuijten, the Federal
Circuit addressed a patent claim for a signal with embedded digital watermark encoded
according to a given encoding process.174 The Federal Circuit said the claimed invention
was “not a ‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter’ . . . thus, such a
signal cannot be patentable subject matter.”175 In other words, “inventors invent operable
embodiments.”176
¶55
The Supreme Court has recognized that an invention exists before the claim is
filed. In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,177 the inventor Pfaff had submitted drawings of
his invention to Wells Electronics, and Wells had provided Pfaff with a written
confirmation of a previous oral purchase order for the computer chip socket in question,
all more than a year before Well’s patent application.178 Of course, there was no patent
claim filed at the critical time: one year prior to the patent application under § 102(b).
The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s finding that the Pfaff patent was “invalid
because the invention had been on sale for more than one year in this country before he
filed his patent application.”179 In other words, “the subject matter invented by the
inventor exist[ed] before a patent is ever filed and before any claims have been
written.”180
¶56
The Supreme Court has also held that under § 271(a), a defendant has made the
“patented invention” only when it has completed the “operable assembly of the whole

idea.”). If the specification discloses a broader invention than claimed, then generally the broader part
disclosed in the specification that is not claimed is deemed to be disclaimed and free for the public to use.
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
172
There was no change in § 101 as the result of the AIA. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
173
Liivak, supra note 34, at 68–69.
174
500 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
175
Id. at 1356. As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences concluding the patent claim did not reflect patentable subject matter.
176
Liivak, supra note 34, at 68.
177
525 U.S. 55 (1998).
178
Id. at 57–58. Section 102(b) ()(pre-AIA) provided that an inventor did not have the right to a
patent if the “invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use of on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States.”
179
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68–69. However, for cases to which the AIA will apply, “the invention date .
. . is no longer relevant to determining which of two rival claimants for a patent will prevail.” Mueller,
supra note 3, at 22, n.54. The “AIA generally awards the patent to the first inventor to file her patent
application,” but “a second (i.e., later in time) filer will obtain the patent if the second filer had publicly
disclosed the invention before the first filer’s effective filing date and thereafter files her own (i.e., the
second filer’s) application in a timely fashion.” Id. at 233, n.208.
180
Liivak, supra note 162, at 16.
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and not the manufacture of its parts” in the United States.181 The Court added that a
“patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and . . . no element, separately
viewed, is within the grant.’”182 In other words, if Patent X claims a product
“comprising” A, B and C, then patent X covers both a constructed product composed of
A, B, C and D and a constructed product composed of A, B, C and E.183
¶57
There are a number of disclosure requirements in §112, including: (1) enablement
and (2) written description of the invention.184 The “enablement requirement is satisfied
when one skilled in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the claimed
invention without undue experimentation.”185 The written description requirement,
discussed next, has been more controversial.186
¶58
Initially, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), a predecessor
court to the Federal Circuit,187 conflated the written description requirement with the
181
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). Deepsouth involved
patents held by Laitram for deveining shrimp and whether Deepsouth infringed those patents by making
and shipping to foreign customers all the parts for the deveining machines. Id. at 523–24. The Supreme
Court held there was no infringement because the patented product had not been completed in the United
States. Id. 525–26, 532. After Deepsouth, Congress amended § 271 to add § 271(f)(1) stating that whoever
“without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion
of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable
as an infringer.” See Mueller, supra note 3, at 512–17. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
444–45 (2007), the Supreme Court explained that 271(f) “expands the definition of infringement to include
supplying from the United States a patented invention’s components.” However, § 271(a) still refers to the
“patented invention.”
182
Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961)).
183
“Comprising” is an “open” claim term, and “consisting of” is a “closed” claim term. Professors
Merges and Duffy write, “If the claim reads ‘an invention comprising elements A, B and C,’ long tradition
in the patent field dictates that the claim covers any embodiment of the invention having elements A, B and
C and any additional elements.” Merges, supra note 6, at 28 (emphasis in original). In contrast, “[i]“f you
claim ‘An invention consisting of elements A, B and C,’ someone selling a variant that also incorporates
element D does not infringe your claim.” Id. See also infra notes 405–11 and accompanying text for
discussion of In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
184
See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. Of course, both are satisfied through writing in
the application. Omitted from the text accompanying note 164 is the requirement that an applicant disclose
the “best mode” for carrying out the invention. However, the AIA provided that “the failure to disclose the
best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise
unenforceable.” 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A)(2011). Another requirement in § 112 (pre-AIA) is that the claims
particularly point out and distinctly claim “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
AIA § 112(b) has essentially the same language, but substituted “inventor or a joint inventor” for
“applicant” and “the” for “his.” See § 112 (post-AIA). For the most recent Supreme Court decision on the
meaning of the definite claim requirement, see Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120
(2014).
185
Automotive Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
186
Cotropia, supra note 168, at 1871.
187
Mueller, supra note 3, at 40. In addition, “Congress in 1958 (72 Stat. 848) declared that the
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was created under Article III. In 1961, a congressional statute
designated the chief judge of the court as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was abolished in 1982 when its judges and its jurisdiction were
transferred to the new U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” History of the Federal Judiciary:
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enablement requirement, and concluded that the “original claim, in itself constituted a
description in the original disclosure equivalent in scope and identical in language to the
total subject matter now being claimed.”188 Over time, however, the CCPA and then the
Federal Circuit applied a written description requirement separate from the enablement
requirement, but first only when the patent applicant had amended the claims after the
initial application.189 In a series of subsequent decisions, discussed next, the Federal
Circuit established the rule that the written description requirement applied to all patents,
not simply those in which the applicant had substantively changed its claims during
prosecution.190
¶59
The en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli
Lilly and Co.191 involved genus claims of “methods for regulating cellular responses to
external stimuli” to “reduce the harmful symptoms of certain diseases.”192 Relying on
such decisions as Morse and Schriber,193 the en banc Federal Circuit held that “even after
the introduction of claims,”194 the statute required a written description of what the
applicant had invented, separate from the enablement requirement.195
¶60
The Federal Circuit in Ariad repeated a number of times that in order for a patent
claim to be valid, the specification had to disclose embodiments of the genus.196 A
generic claim could define the boundaries of a broad genus, but “the question may still
remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/courts_special_cpa.html[https://perma.cc/83Z6-7GZF].
188
In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1973), rehearing denied, 480 F.2d 879, 879–80
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[W]e consider the original claim in itself adequate ‘written description’ of the claimed
invention. It was equally a ‘written description’ whether located among the original claims or in the
descriptive part of the specification.”).
189
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 991, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914
(C.C.P.A. 1973);Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
190
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633 (1998); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d
1303, 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
191
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
192
Id. at 1340. Claim 80 of the ‘516 patent, re-written to include the claim from which it
depended, recited: “A method for modifying effects of external influences on a eukaryotic cell, which
external influences induce NF-êB-mediated intracellular signaling, the method comprising altering NF-êB
activity in the cells such that NF-êB-mediated effects of external influences are modified, wherein NF-êB
activity in the cell is reduced] wherein reducing NF-êB activity comprises reducing binding of NF-êB to
NF-êB recognition sites on genes which are transcriptionally regulated by NF-êB.” Id.
193
Id. at 1345, 1346.
194
Id. at 1345.
195
Id. at 1345–46.
196
Disclosing embodiments is not the same as constructing a prototype or reducing an invention to
practice. As the Federal Circuit explained, “the written description requirement does not demand either
examples or an actual reduction to practice; a constructive reduction to practice that in a definite way
identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written description requirement.” Id. at 1352. An “actual
reduction to practice involves constructing a physical embodiment of the invention that works for its
intended purpose.” Mueller, supra note 3, at 123, n.32. A “‘constructive reduction to practice’ occurs when
an inventor files a patent application that discloses his invention in compliance with the first paragraph of
35 U.S.C. § 112.” Id.
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the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the genus.”197 Genus
claims containing functional language create particular problems, because they “may
simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that
result.”198 The court said that the written description requirement meant the applicant
must show it “has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionallydefined genus.”199 The court added that “merely drawing a fence around the outer limits
of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials
constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a
species.”200
¶61
The Federal Circuit in Ariad explained that an adequate written description
“requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the
scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one
of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.”201 It added,
“Nor do we set out any bright- line rules governing, for example, the number of species
that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with
each invention, and it changes with progress in a field.”202 It held that the claims in Ariad
were invalid because the specification did not satisfy the written description
requirement.203
¶62
More recently, in Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS,204 the
Federal Circuit addressed the validity of a patent issued on a continuation application
filed in 2009 that claimed priority from Novozymes’ earlier 2000 provisional
application.205 The 2000 provisional application “disclosed a potentially enormous
number of alpha-amylase variants,” but “did not point out the specific variants later
claimed” in the patent issued to Novozmes (the 2010 Patent).206 After Novozymes had
learned of DuPont’s alpha-amylase variant,207 Novozymes added patent claims that the
district court subsequently found DuPont infringed.208
¶63
The Federal Circuit in Novozymes said one of the issues was “whether the 2000
application demonstrates to one of ordinary skill in the art that, by the application's filing
date, Novozymes had invented the particular alpha-amylase variants that Novozymes
claimed almost a decade later in the” 2010 patent.209 Since the disclosure had not shown
197

Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
200
Id. at 1350.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 1351.
203
Id. at 1358.
204
723 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
205
Id. at 1341. Section 111(b) covers provisional applications and provides that a claim is not
required for a provisional application. If the invention claimed in the nonprovisional application “was
adequately supported by the disclosure of the of the provisional application in accordance with 35 U.S.C.
§112,¶1 . . . , the application can claim for the later nonprovisional application the benefit of the earlier
provisional application’s filing date . . .” Mueller, supra note 3, at 54.
206
Novozymes A/S, 723 F.3d at 1343.
207
Id. at 1341.
208
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Novozymes on infringement, and the
jury awarded damages to Novozymes exceeding $18 million. Id. at 1338.
209
Id. at 1348 (emphasis added).
198
199
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that by the time of the priority date for the patent application (2000), Novozymes had
invented the variant infringed by DuPont, the Federal Circuit held that Novozymes’
patent claim was invalid.210 In other words, although Ariad made clear that a genus claim
does not have to expressly identify in the specification all the species in a claimed
genus,211 under Novozymes the specification does have to adequately disclose the species
which the patentee subsequently claims someone else is infringing.
¶64
After Ariad genus patents can still issue, since a specification can adequately
disclose a genus with “either a representative number of species falling within the scope
of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus.”212 Professor
Liivak explained that “the description of an actual embodiment that has been reduced to
practice can be part of the support for a broader genus claim when the specification also
discloses additional information, like some ‘correlation between function and structure,’
of the genus, or as put by the Supreme Court, some ‘quality common to’ the genus.”213
Indeed, most claims are genus claims in one respect, since Professor Crouch has pointed
out that “most claims cover an infinite variety of potential embodiments each involving a
minor tweak in one way or another.”214
¶65
The question remains what happens once the USPTO has awarded a genus patent
for a composition, assuming the defendant does not challenge the validity of the genus
patent under one of the AIA post grant procedures to challenge validity.215 This article
discusses that question next.

210
Id. at 1348 and 1351. See also AbbVie Deutschland GMBH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759
F.3d 1285, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (requiring that the patents must at least describe some species
representative of antibodies that are structurally similar to Stelara, the allegedly infringing product).
211
See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
212
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d at 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
In 2009, before the en banc decision in Ariad, Professor Adams wrote that the written description
requirement would “eliminate the . . . circumstance where an inventor could make a valid claim to a genus
containing species that the inventor did not invent.” Adams, supra note 94, at 65. Professor Adams was
correct in concluding that genus patents could only issue in the future if the inventor had invented the
species claimed. Supra at notes 191-204 and accompanying text. See also Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit:
To Satisfy the Written Description Requirement, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 8, 2016),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/07/description-requirement-representative.html[https://perma.cc/P6H5282H] (“By design, patent claims generally cover a set of a variety of potential embodiments. . . . The
courts have never required that all potential embodiments be disclosed. . . . [T]he operative question . . . [is]
how many different species (embodiments) of an invention must be described in a patent document before
the applicant can properly claim rights to the genus of all related species.”).
213
Liivak, supra note 34, at 89.
214
Id. As mentioned above, supra note 6, “genus” and “species” are simply relative terms when
comparing one claim to another, understanding that one is a genus compared to the other, and the second is
a species compared to the genus.
215
See, e.g., §§ 311-319 (post-AIA) (inter partes review) and §§ 321-329 (post-AIA) (post-grant
review). In inter partes review—§ 316(e) ()(post-AIA)—and post grant review—§ 326(e) ()(post-AIA)—
the challenger to a patent has the burden of proving invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Supreme Court granted cert. on Jan. 15, 2016 in In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, a case involving inter
partes review procedures. See In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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The Presumption is that a Patentee Invented the Species Within the Scope of its
Patented Genus Claim

¶66

Once an individual obtains a patent (including of course a genus patent), there is a
presumption that the patent is valid, and that presumption can only be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence.216 This presumption particularly makes sense with the written
description requirement because of the oath or declaration an applicant must sign and
submit to the USPTO that “he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for
which he solicits patent.”217
¶67
In Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.,218 the Federal Circuit addressed a
similar situation where a patentee assigned its patent to another party and signed an
affidavit for the assignee that the patent was valid, but the assignor subsequently was
sued for infringement by the assignee and defended it on the ground that the patent was
invalid. The Federal Circuit said that the primary consideration was “the measure of
unfairness and injustice that would be suffered by the assignee if the assignor were
allowed to raise defenses of patent invalidity.”219 The Federal Circuit held in such a
situation that the assignor “should be estopped from defending patent infringement
claims by proving that what he assigned was worthless.”220 Similarly, when an applicant
for a genus patent obtains a patent for a genus after submitting an oath or declaration to
the USPTO that it invented the genus, the applicant should be estopped from
subsequently taking a different position and saying it had not invented the species when
(a) applying for a patent for a species within the genus, or (b) trying to enforce the
subsequent species patent within the scope of the genus against a third party.
¶68
Can the holder of a genus patent at least limit any estoppel by arguing that she
cannot be required to have invented species within the genus resulting from advances in
technology not known at the time of the genus invention? It is true that patentees have at
times been victorious in infringement litigation against defendants selling products using
after-arising technology.221 However, the two reasons this has occurred would not be
applicable to First Inventions by a pharmaceutical company with a broad genus patent

216
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) provides in relevant part, “A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden
of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”
In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), the Supreme Court held that § 282
“requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 2242. In a concurring
opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice Breyer said, “I believe it worth emphasizing that in this
area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of
law.” Id. at 2253.
217
35 U.S.C. § 115 (pre-AIA). Section 115(b)(2) (post-AIA) similarly requires an oath or
declaration that the applicant “believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an original joint
inventor of a claimed invention in the application.” An alternate oath or declaration can be submitted if the
inventor is under an obligation to assign the invention to the applicant and has refused to sign the oath.
§ 115(d) (post-AIA).
218
Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
219
Id. at 1225.
220
Id. at 1226.
221
See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1359–68 (2014);
and Lemley, supra note 9, at 1003–05.
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and a subsequent patent application by that company for a species within the scope of the
genus.
¶69
First, compliance with the enablement doctrine is determined at the time the patent
applicant files its application,222 so “[a]n inventor can properly claim broad subject matter
so long as her research enables one skilled in the art to make and use her claimed
invention as that invention was understood at the filing date.”223 On the other hand, in
determining the existence of infringement, “Literal claim scope is not limited to the
technologies that are already in existence at the time a claim is filed. It routinely
encompasses technology . . . that can be realized only after a post-filing technological
advance has occurred.”224 As a result of this “temporal paradox,”225 technologies
unknown at the time of the patent application have not been taken into account in
determining whether the specification enabled the claim, but have been taken into
account in determining if the patent claim covered an accused product at the time of the
alleged infringement.226
¶70
Yet now that the written description requirement under Ariad is a separate
requirement than enablement, for a patent claim to be valid the inventor must have
invented/possessed the scope of the genus at the time of the application.227 Therefor the
temporal paradox does not apply for written descriptions, and Professor Collins has
concluded that “the principal impact of the written description requirement has been to
restrict the reach of literal claim scope into after-arising technology.”228 He added that
“all Federal Circuit cases that use the written description doctrine to invalidate claims
have achieved a single goal: they have invalidated claims that were deemed to reach too
far into after arising technology, i.e., technology that is not invented until after the
patent applicant files her application.”229 Similarly recognizing that Ariad limits the
222
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Whether the earlier
applications enable the claims of the ‘561 patent is determined as of the filing date of each application.”).
223
Merges, supra note 6, at 284.
224
Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1086
(Summer 2009).
225
Merges, supra note 6, at 284 (emphasis added).
226
Merges and Duffy give the hypothetical of a patent for “fuzzballs,” assuming they were new,
nonobvious and useful, and assuming further that at the time of application fuzzballs were only made of
wool and cotton. The technology evolved and fuzzballs could be made from synthetic fibers. They write,
“Thus the definition of fuzzballs used in the question, ‘Did you enable the making of all fuzzballs?’ does
not change over time, while the definition of the same term in the question, ‘Did someone infringe the
claim to all fuzzballs?’ does change to reflect the inevitable growth of fuzzball technology.” Id. at 285; cf.
Promega Corp. v. Life Tech. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (whether a claim is enabled by
the specification, in light of after-arising technologies, may depend on whether the term “comprising” is
used in one of the individual limitations of a claim rather than the preamble to the claim).
227
Supra notes 112–204 and accompanying text. See also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG
v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“functionally defined claims can meet the
written description requirement if a reasonable structure-function correlation is established, whether by the
inventor as described in the specification or known in the art at the time of the filing date.”); Bos. Sci.
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the four corners of the
specification directly contradict information that the patentee alleges is “well-known” to a person of skill at
the effective filing date, no reasonable jury could conclude that the patentee possessed the invention.”).
228
Kevin Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent
Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L. J. 24, 60 (2010).
229
Id. at 62–63.
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ability of patentees to cover after-arising technology in their claims of literal
infringement, Professor Cotropia concluded that “after-arising technologies can fall
within a patent’s scope of exclusivity only be resorting to the doctrine of equivalents.”230
¶71
Turning to after-arising technology and the doctrine of equivalents, “the proper
time for evaluating equivalency—and thus knowledge of interchangeability between
elements—is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.”231
Therefore, “[t]he doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial
alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be
created through trivial changes.”232 It follows that the doctrine of equivalents is not
applicable when the claim was captured in drafting the original genus claim.
¶72
Put another way: “Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception . . . ,
not the rule.”233 It applies when there is no literal infringement, as the Supreme Court
indicated when it said, “The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”234 Similarly, Professor Mueller has
said, “The doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of patent infringement liability for
accused devices that are not encompassed within the literal scope of a claim.”235 A
species within the scope of a genus is not an equivalent to the genus, but part of the
literally claimed genus, so there is no authority for applying the doctrine of equivalents
when there is literal infringement.
¶73
Professor Holbrook observed that “the Federal Circuit has precluded access to the
doctrine of equivalents if the asserted equivalent is one that should have been in the
inventor’s possession during the application process. ”236 Of course, the First Inventor
has already submitted an oath that she was in possession of – had invented - the
species.237 The Supreme Court vacated an earlier Federal Circuit decision in Festo and
limited the use of the doctrine of equivalents when there had been a narrowing
amendment during patent prosecution, but allowed the doctrine of equivalents to
“capture” products encompassing after-arising technologies when the “equivalent may
have been unforeseeable at the time of the application.”238 In the case of a species within
the scope of a genus patent claim by the same party, the same party has already submitted
an oath that she invented the genus, and the genus claim covers the species, so the
230
Christopher A. Cotropia, ‘After-Arising’ Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 153 (2005).
231
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
232
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
233
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
234
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 732.
235
Mueller, supra note 3 at 107, note 86.
236
Holbrook, supra note 56, at 15 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
493 F.3d 1368, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (rejecting the patent claim, because, “Not only was the use of a nonmagnetic sleeve disclosed in the prior art, the ‘125 patent application itself clearly recognized the
possibility of using a non-magnetic material for the sleeve.”).
237
Supra note 217.
238
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740. The Supreme Court added two other situations in which the
doctrine of equivalents could apply, neither of which would be applicable to the case of a genus patent and
subsequent species patent within the scope of the genus: “[T]he rationale underlying the amendment may
bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute
in question.” Id. at 740–41.
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Supreme Court’s description of when the doctrine of equivalents could be available for
unforeseeable events would be of no help to the First Inventor who has already literally
claimed that species.239
¶74
As a result, the possibility of after-arising technologies does not provide a valid
basis for arguing that courts should allow a pharmaceutical company to circumvent
Morse, Schriber and Ariad.
D.

Summary

¶75

The “invention is not simply a shorthand reference for the claimed subject matter,”
but a “substantive technical concept” of the “inventor’s own solution to some technical
problem for which the inventor seeks a patent.”240 Defining “the invention by the
detailed technology discussion in the patent specification’s descriptions and drawings”
appropriately “grounds exclusivity in what the inventor has actually done or plans to
do.”241 A claim may be narrower than what is disclosed in the specification and still be
valid,242 but if it is broader than what is disclosed, the claim is invalid, and the USPTO
should reject the application. 243
¶76
Under Ariad, an application for a genus patent “must demonstrate sufficient
support in the specification to justify the scope of the claim by showing that the inventor
was in possession of the entirety of the claimed invention.” (emphasis added)244 Once the
patent is granted, there is a presumption the patent is valid, 245 which means the inventor
invented the species claimed at the time of the patent application. All species within the
scope of the genus constitute the patented invention.246
¶77
The next part of this article argues that this presumption of patent validity should
prevent the holder of the genus patent from defending a double patenting challenge to its
subsequent patent for a species within the genus by arguing he had not really invented, or
239
There is language in In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606–07 (C.C.P.A. 1977) that may suggest that
a claim for a pioneer invention “can literally encompass later-developed technologies.” Cotropia, supra
note 231, at 167. However, Hogan occurred decades before Ariad split the written description requirement
from enablement that limited the reach of claims into subject matter encompassing after-arising technology.
In addition, Professor Cotropia notes, “T“[he court in Hogan did not specifically hold that claim language
can literally include after-arising technologies. In fact, the weight of Federal Circuit authority indicates the
opposite.” Id.; see also Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340–42
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Moreover, in the case of a genus patent and a patent for a species within the scope of the
genus by the same inventor, the genus patent has already been granted, and in many such cases it was
admitted that the species was within the literal scope of the genus. See, e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co. Ltd. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012); infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text; AbbVie Inc. v.
Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology, 764 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014); infra notes 454–73
and accompanying text. There would be no basis for applying the doctrine of equivalents.
240
Liivak, supra note 162, at 5.
241
Cotropia, supra note 168, at 1855–56.
242
If a claim is narrower than what has been disclosed, then what is disclosed but not claimed is
free to the public to use. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc).
243
Supra notes 162 and 171.
244
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 794 (2011)
(emphasis added); see also supra notes 191–204 and accompanying text for discussion of Ariad.
245
Supra note 217.
246
Supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
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possessed, the species at the time he obtained the genus patent. Put simply, a patentee
should not be allowed to argue on the one hand he has invented the full scope of a genus
but on the other hand subsequently defend a challenge to its species patent on the ground
that he had not really invented the full scope of the genus at the time of the genus
application.
III. IT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED DOUBLE PATENTING FOR AN INVENTOR OR EMPLOYER TO
APPLY FOR A PATENT FOR A SPECIES WITHIN SCOPE OF GENUS PATENT HELD BY SAME
INVENTOR OR EMPLOYER
A.

Supreme Court/Supreme Court Justice: One Person May Not Cover the Same
Invention with Two Patents

¶78

In the 1800s federal courts announced and applied the common sense principle that
“no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent, especially to
the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may differ.” (emphasis added)247 If
by “covered” the courts had meant that a patentee could not hold two patents that were
the same, then any person could easily navigate around such doctrine by obtaining a
second patent that was only different in minor ways (e.g., the first patent covered 100
embodiments of a widget, whereas the second patent only covered 99 of the same
embodiments) and essentially extend the first patent by years. 248 The Supreme Court and
its justices did not so limit the principle.
¶79
Before discussing at length the most significant Supreme Court decision on what
has become known as double patenting, Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,249 the Court discusses
three earlier decisions because the Court in Miller had done so in its holding. In none was
there consideration of whether the two patents “covered” the “same invention” limited to
comparing the patent claims.
¶80
Even before the practice of patent claims had appeared,250 the Circuit Court for the
District of Massachusetts had addressed double patenting in Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail
Factory.251 Here, the plaintiff had obtained two patents on machinery for cutting, griping
and heading nails: one in 1807 and the other in 1810 for the “invention and
improvements.”252 Supreme Court Justice Story, sitting as a Circuit Justice, said, “[i]t
247

Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894) (emphasis added).
Professors Merges and Duffy point out that under the Patent Act of 1952, if two different
individuals applied for the same patent, that would be addressed by an interference and determination of
priority under § 102(g). Merges, supra note 6, at 1145.
249
See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], pp. 9-9 to 9-10 (“Miller . . . is the leading
Supreme Court case on double patenting.”). See infra notes 271–303 and accompanying text discussing
Miller.
250
Supra notes 134–45 and accompanying text.
251
Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 2 Mason 28 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1819).
252
Id. at 578. Both were issued to Jesse Reed. Id. At the time, § 1 of the patent statute provided
that a “citizen or citizens of the United States” could be eligible to receive a patent for an invention if “he
or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used
before the application.” CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 10-1. There was no separate section
expressly discussing or defining what constituted prior art. Id. at app. 10-1 to 10-5.
248

350

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

2017

cannot be, that a patentee can have in use at the same time two valid patents for the same
invention; and if he can successively take out at different times new patents for the same
invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.”253 He added that a
different result “would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public
for the grant of the patent, viz. the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term
specified in the original grant.”254 He concluded that the first patent “is an estoppel to any
future patent for the same invention.”255
¶81
By the time of James v. Campbell in 1881,256 patent applications included
claims,257 but the Supreme Court looked beyond the claims to the specifications for the
patents, which involved implements for postmarking letters.258 The original patent was
issued in 1863,259 but that was surrendered and reissued in 1864, 1869 and 1870,260 with
additional matter added in the process.261After discussing the drawings and other parts of
the specifications,262 the Court stated the general principle that “the patentee could not
include in a subsequent patent any invention embraced or described in a prior one granted
to himself, any more than he could an invention embraced or described in a prior patent
granted to a third person.”263
¶82
In 1891, as the Supreme Court had in James, the Supreme Court in McCreary v.
Pennsylvania Canal Co. 264 also looked beyond the claims to the rest of the specification
to compare the inventions.265 McCreary involved two patents—one issued to John
McCreary266 and the other to Elijah and John McCreary267—that involved improvements
253
Id. at 579. Quoting from Odiorne and closely following its language, the Federal Circuit in
Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014) restated the principle as follows:
“‘It cannot be’ that a patentee can obtain two patents in sequence ‘substantially for the same invention [ ]
and improvements’; ‘it would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public for the
grant of the patent, viz., the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term.’” Id. at 1212.
254
Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 579.
255
Id.
256
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
257
Supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
258
James, 104 U.S. at 357.
259
Id. at 359.
260
Id. at 357, 371. The Supreme Court first approved the practice of reissuing defective patents in
1832, and that practice was codified in the Patent Act of 1836. Mueller, supra note 3, at 405. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 251–252 for current provisions for the reissuance of patents.
261
James, 104 U.S. at 375–76 (“Another new matter . . . is the making of the blotter of cast iron,
steel or other suitable material. The original specification . . . excludes such material. . . . the patentee has
added two new diagrams to his drawings.”)
262
Id. at 360, 375, 376, 379.
263
Id. at 382. The Court concluded: the claims with the additional matter were void. Id. at 375.
The broad claims were void as anticipated by inventions patented in England and the United States. Id. at
378–79. The broad claims were void because the defendant did not use the specific device covered by the
remaining claim of the second patent. Id. at 383.
264
McCreary v. Pa. Canal Co., 141 U.S. 459 (1891).
265
The Court was quoting from the third paragraph of the specification of U.S. Patent No. 129,844
when it said, “I“[n patent numbered 129,844 the patentee stated that his improvement upon the prior patent
consisted ‘in substituting for the projecting cut-water and notch, described in said patent for centering the
boats together and forming a universal joint, a chain attached at both ends to one boat, and at its center to a
central point on the adjacent end of the other boat,’ etc.” 141 U.S. at 462.
266
See U.S. Patent No. 129,844.
267
See U.S. Patent No. 125,684.
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in steering devices for canal boats.268 The Court noted that the “combination of the earlier
patent . . . is substantially contained in the later” and said that “if it be identical with it, or
only a colorable variation from it, the second patent would be void, as a patentee cannot
take out two patents for the same invention.”269
¶83
In 1894, the Supreme Court gave its most detailed discussion of the prohibition
against double patenting - one inventor obtaining two patents covering similar structures,
but with modifications of a spring - in Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.270 In Miller there were
two patents derived from the same initial patent application271 for improvements in
“wheeled cultivators,” and defendants claimed that “the invention shown in each of the
patents in suit is identical.”272 However, the 1879 patent had 12 claims,273 and those
claims differed from the 5 claims of the 1881 patent.274 Although the two sheets of
drawings for both patents in the specifications seemed to be the same,275 the 1879 patent
specification said the invention “consists in a spring which serves the double purpose of
lifting or holding down the plows at will; and it is further stated that one spring may be
adapted to serve all, or either one or more, of the offices above enumerated.”276 On the
other hand, the specification of the 1881 patent described a narrower scope for the 1881
patent, describing “the same invention or device covered by the patent of December 16,
1879, [but] attempts to limit the invention and patent to the lifting operation of the
springs, increasing as the beams are raised.”277
268
Id. at 461–62. However, the plaintiffs did not assert John McCreary’s earlier patent in the
infringement suit. Id.
269
Id. at 467 (emphasis added). The master found that McCreary was limited to such profits as
arose from the use of the improvement identified in the second patent. Id. at 463. Since no damages were
proved for the improvement covered by the second patent, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the
master. Id. at 467–68.
270
151 U.S. 186 (1894). See also CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], pp. 9-9 to 9-10.
271
Id. at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], p. 9-10 (“Because of an interference with another application, Wright
divided his application. The first patent (#222,767) issued on December 16, 1879, for the double action
claim. After disposition of the interference, the second patent (#242,497) issued on June 7, 1881.”).
272
Miller, 151 U.S. at 187.
273
U.S. Patent No. 222,767, pp. 2–3.
274
U.S. Patent No. 242,497, p. 3.
275
Sheets 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 222,767 and U.S. Patent No. 242,497.
276
Miller, 151 U.S. at 200.
277
Id. at 193. Chisum refers to the later ’497 patent as a “generic device. . . (i.e., a spring that
provides no lifting force when in the operative position but lifting force when raised).” CHISUM, supra note
77, at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], p. 9-11. However, claims 1–3 of the earlier ’767 patent and the third paragraph of
the specification for the ’767 patent made clear it applied where one or both functions were involved, as a
result of adapting springs on the cultivator (genus patent): “In carrying out my invention the one spring
may be adapted to serve all or either one or more of the offices above enumerated [downward force and
lifting] and may be modified in its form, construction, and arrangement, as desired, provided its mode of
action is retained.” On the other hand, all the claims of the later ’497 patent showed a single lifting function
with adapted springs. See ’497 patent claims 1-5. See also ’497 patent p. 1, ll. 20-24 (“To this end the
invention consists in applying lifting-springs in such manner that they exert upon the beams a maximum
power or strain when the latter are above an operative position.”). The Court in Miller quoted the third
paragraph of the specification from the ’767 patent (Id. at 188-189), so regardless of whether today a court
would give the specifications less weight and treat the second claim as generic relative to the first under
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court in Miller did not treat the
subsequent ’497 patent claims as generic. If it had, it could have easily rejected the second patent as invalid
under its statement that a “second patent, although containing a broader claim, more generical [sic] in its
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¶84

The Supreme Court in Miller then summarized its view of existing case law, such
as Odiorne, James and McCreary.278 The Court said that “no patent can issue for [1] an
invention actually covered by a former patent, [2] especially to the same patentee, [3]
although the terms of the claims may differ.”279 The third quoted phrase, “terms of the
claims may differ,” suggests that in determining whether the same invention is involved,
courts must look at the embodiments of the inventions disclosed in the specifications and
not simply what the draftsman claimed to be the invention.280 Although one might argue
that this statement could refer to the use of different words in two claims that meant the
same thing (e.g., twelve inches vs. a foot), the specifications showed the springs in the
two cultivators were adapted to perform different functions.281 In other words, this was
not a situation where the claims used different words to mean the same thing but a
situation where the claims used different words and the specifications showed the springs
differed.
¶85
The second quoted phrase, “especially to the same patentee,” suggests that a patent
for an improvement to a third party could be treated differently than a patent to the First
Inventor for an improvement within the scope of the First Patent.282 While a different
party could have a blocking patent for the Improvement, the First Inventor would not be
allowed to obtain such a Follow-On Patent because he already had received his reward
for the genus that included the species subsequently claimed.283
¶86
The first quoted phrase, “covered by a former patent,” appears to refer to any
invention within the scope of the claims of the first patent. That statement should
preclude granting a patent for a species within the scope of the genus to the same
inventor, because the genus would have covered and given the exclusive right to make
and sell that species to the First Inventor.284 Indeed although Morse was not decided on
double patenting, the dicta that Morse “could not take out a subsequent patent for a
portion of his first invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period limited
by law”285 is consistent with the principle stated in Miller 40 years later.
¶87
The Court in Miller also said that a “second patent, although containing a broader
claim, more generical in its character than the specific claims, contained in the prior

character, than the specific claims, contained in the prior patent, is also void.” Miller, 151 U.S. at 198. It
did not reject the second patent under the principle that a species of a genus anticipates a subsequent and
broader genus. Thus, it seems the Court considered the ’497 patent narrower in scope than the earlier ’767
patent.
278
Id. at 198.
279
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
280
The Supreme Court has expressed concern about not allowing attorneys to maneuver around
patent principles with clever drafting. See supra note 33.
281
See ’497 patent para. 3 and ’767 patent para. 3.
282
Indeed, the Court observed, “If the two patents in question had been granted to different
parties, it admits of no question that the last would have been held an infringement of the first.” Miller, 151
U.S. at 200.
283
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text for Professor Duffy’s suggestion that there are
policy reasons for treating improvements by First Inventors differently than improvements by third parties.
284
Supra note 3.
285
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1864).
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patent, is also void.”286 This is a reflection of the now recognized principle – at least
when the earlier patent is prior art - that a species anticipates a genus.287
¶88
In addition, the Court in Miller discussed the situation “where the second patent
covers matter described in the prior patent, essentially distinct and separable from the
invention covered thereby. . .”288 The Court explained, “A single invention may include
both the machine and the manufacture it creates; and in such cases, if the inventions are
really separable, the inventor may be entitled to a monopoly of each.”289 In other words,
if an inventor creates a new and useful machine290 that produces a new and useful widget,
she could patent both the machine and the widget the machine produced. The Court in
Miller continued that in order for the second patent to be upheld in that situation, “it must
distinctly appear that the invention covered by the later patent was a separate invention,
distinctly different and independent from that covered by the first patent.”291
¶89
Although the Court did not directly explain the meaning of “distinctly different and
independent,” it added that the improvement “must consist in something more than a
mere distinction of the breadth or scope of the claims of each patent.”292 A species within
the scope of a genus is only different in breadth and scope from the genus claim.293
Therefore, the statement that a mere distinction of the breadth or scope of the claims – as
well as the earlier statement in Miller “covered by a former patent”294 – should eliminate
granting a species patent within the scope of a genus patent to the inventor who had
already patented the genus.
¶90
The Supreme Court agreed that an inventor could make an improvement on his
own invention and obtain a patent “where the invention is clearly distinct from, and
independent of, one previously patented.”295 However, the Court concluded there was no
distinct difference between the inventions in Miller, since the “matter sought to be
covered by the second patent” was “inseparably involved in the matter embraced in the
former patent.”296 This is consistent with rejecting a patent application by an inventor for
a species after that inventor obtained a genus patent that covered the species, since the
species patent would be “inseparably involved in the matter embraced in the former

286

Miller, 151 U.S. at 198.
Mueller, supra note 3, at 177 (“A heuristic to keep in mind for anticipation in the species/genus
context is that species anticipates genus, but genus does not necessarily anticipate species.”).
288
Miller, 151 U.S. at 198.
289
Miller, 151 U.S. at 199. See also ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, PATENT CLAIMS § 20:6,
pt. 3, ch. 20 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing Miller and stating, “An apparatus and a product made by the
apparatus are distinct inventions if it can be shown that the apparatus as claimed is not an obvious
apparatus for making the product, and the apparatus as claimed can be used to make another materially
different product, or that the product as claimed can be made by another materially different apparatus,”
citing MPEP § 806.05(g)(9th ed.)).
290
At the time of Miller, there was no non-obviousness requirement. Congress passed that
requirement in 1952. Mueller, supra note 3, at 276.
291
Miller, 151 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
292
Id.
293
A species within a genus has an additional limitation, but by the definition of a genus, the
species, even with the additional limitation, is within the scope of the genus claim. Mueller, supra note 3.
294
Supra notes 280 and 285 and accompanying text.
295
Miller, 151 U.S. at 199.
296
Id. at 200.
287
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patent.”297 On the other hand, if a subsequent patent claim by the First Inventor was not
within the scope of the First Invention, that patent claim should issue,298 because the
patent he had already received had not covered the subsequent invention.
¶91
The Supreme Court in Miller explained “It certainly did not involve patentable
novelty to drop or omit from the patent a claim for the depressing action of the spring
arrangement which might be effected by any mere mechanical contrivance.”299 The Court
continued that “a patentee cannot so split up his invention for the purpose of securing
additional results, or of extending or of prolonging the life of any or all of its elemental
parts.”300 The Court held that the second patent was void.301
¶92
The Supreme Court in Miller did not discuss or even identify the statutory basis for
the prohibition on double patenting. This is not surprising, since Professor Menell has
observed that “the most influential patent jurists [of the nineteenth century] . . . operated
in a less formal, common- law-oriented mode. . . . they did not typically tie their
interpretation strictly to statutory text . . . . they evolved patent law into a workable,
dynamic system.”302 As discussed next, however, the Federal Circuit has identified a
statutory basis for double patenting and constructed a complicated set of rules Supreme
Court in Miller.
B.

Double Patenting in the Federal Circuit
1. Introduction

¶93

As set forth above in IIC, a person inventing a new and useful composition of
matter has a right to a patent for that composition, assuming the other criteria for
patentability are satisfied. A person does not have the right to a patent, however, if that
patent claim exceeds the scope of the embodiments disclosed in the specification. The
embodiments are key. Moreover, “patented invention” in § 271(a) refers to any
composition satisfying the elements of a genus patent claim, even though many of those
compositions would fit within the definition of a narrower genus (e.g., a widget of
A+B+C+D and a widget of A+B+C would be a patented invention of and would infringe
a patent for a widget comprising A+B).
¶94
Yet in a confusing and inconsistent string of cases discussed in this IVB, the
Federal Circuit has focused on the boundaries of the claims rather than the embodiments
the claims cover. This allows skillful drafters to extend the exclusive rights under patent
law by first claiming the world and subsequently claiming a smaller part of the world.
The Federal Circuit’s decisions are inconsistent with the principle announced in Miller
and Morse and with some earlier decisions of the CCPA and the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits before the creation of the Federal Circuit, discussed below.

297

Id. at 200.
Assuming the other criteria for a patent were satisfied.
Id. Chisum says that this reason for the holding in Miller “is sounder on the facts.” CHISUM,
supra note 77 at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], p. 9-11.
300
Miller, 151 U.S. at 201.
301
Id. at 200.
302
Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wandering in the Wilderness, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1308–09
(2011).
298
299
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The Federal Circuit has labeled as “double patenting”303 its version of the Miller
principle that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent,
especially to the same inventor.”304 The Federal Circuit explained, “If an inventor could
obtain several sequential patents on the same invention, he could retain for himself the
exclusive right to exclude . . . far beyond the term awarded to him under the patent laws,”
and concluded that the “doctrine of double patenting was primarily designed to prevent
such harm by limiting a patentee to one patent term per invention or improvement.”305
¶96
The Federal Circuit has identified two “types” of double patenting: “same invention
type double patenting” and “obviousness type double patenting,”306 also sometimes
known, respectively, as statutory double patenting and nonstatutory double patenting.307
The appellate courts and scholars have concluded that the basis for the same invention
type double patenting prohibition is §101, since it provides that “whoever invents” a
product meeting the requirements for a patent may obtain “a patent” (interpreted to mean
one patent) for her invention.308 However, another statutory basis is the word “new” in
§101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter . . . .”309 If a patent application asks for a patent on a
composition of matter set forth in an earlier patent, the composition of matter in the
second patent application would not be “new” under the commonly understood meaning
of “new,” so should not qualify for a patent under § 101. 310
¶97
Somewhat more obliquely, courts have referred to obviousness-type double
patenting as a “judicially created doctrine.”311 Recently, however, the Federal Circuit said
that “obviousness type double patenting is grounded in the text of the Patent Act,”
referring to § 101.312 Also, as discussed below,313 as a result of the passage of the AIA,
¶95

303

Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Miller).
Miller, 151 U.S. at 198.
305
Gilead Sci., Inc., 753 F.3d at 1212.
306
In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892–93 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
307
Mueller, supra note 3, at 72.
308
In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“35 U.S.C. § 101 prevents two patents from
issuing on the same invention”); Merges, supra note 6, at 1145; Mueller, supra note 3, at 72.
309
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
310
Merriam-Webster defines “new” as “having recently come into existence.” New, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/new (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). There has been
growing recognition by the courts that “new” in § 101 means what it says and is not a historical relic or
identical to novelty in § 102. In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that newness could be disregarded when evaluating
patentable subject matter under § 101 and acknowledged that “the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say,
the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.” Id. at 1304. In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), involving Myriad’s patent claim for isolated DNA and
cDNA segments, the Supreme Court said the issue was whether “Myriad's patents claim any ‘new and
useful . . . composition of matter’” under § 101 or instead claimed naturally occurring phenomena. Id. at
2116. In Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the Federal Circuit
recognized that “pragmatic analysis of § 101 is facilitated by considerations analogous to those of §§ 102
and 103 as applied to the particular case.” Id. at 1347. See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or
Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W.
RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 54–55 (2012).
311
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
312
AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
313
Infra, notes 345–52 and accompanying text.
304
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there is now a more clear statutory basis for obviousness type double patenting, since
§ 3(b)(2) of the AIA incorporates by reference the intent of Congress in the CREATE Act
that the double patenting prohibition should apply when there is no prior art.
2. Significance of “prior art” for double patenting
¶98

When analyzing double patenting, it is necessary to discuss briefly the technical
nature of “prior art,” since the Federal Circuit has said that “‘double patenting’ is
normally applied as a ground of rejection when the patent used to support the double
patenting rejection is not available as a reference to show ‘prior art’ under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 or 103.”314 Of course, a person cannot obtain a patent for an invention unless it is
novel within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (pre-AIA),315 and for an invention to lack
novelty—to be anticipated—there must be “a single prior art disclosure of all elements of
the claimed invention,”316 either expressly or inherently.317 Novelty, however, “does not
mean that the invention has not previously existed in an absolute sense. Rather, it means
that the invention, as claimed, does not fall within—is not anticipated by—one of the
seven categories of prior art defined by Congress in 35 U.S.C. Section 102.”318 Section
102(a) pre-AIA) provides that in order for a prior art reference—such as a printed
publication—to be “prior” art, it must have existed “before the invention.”319
314
In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 868 (C.C.P.A. 1966). Professor Crouch has said that an obviousnesstype double patenting is only relevant when a prior patent cannot be considered prior art as defined by
Sections 102 and 103(a) of the Patent Act. Dennis Crouch, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting and
(May
8,
2009),
Splitting
Ownership
(CAFC
Says
Don’t
Do
It),
PATENTLY-O
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/05/obviousness-type-double-patenting-and-splitting-ownership-cafc-saysdont-do-it.html[https://perma.cc/RS5D-YWQX]. In certain cases, however, in which the Federal Circuit
looked at the specification of the earlier patent to determine whether there was double patenting, the courts
effectively treated the earlier patent specification as prior art. See Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline
PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“a claim to a method of using a composition is not
patentably distinct form an earlier claim to the identical composition in a patent disclosing the identical
use.”); Sun Pharm. Ind., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a finding
of double patenting when “an earlier patent claims a compound, disclosing the utility of that compound in
the specification, and a later patent claims a method of using that compound for a particular use described
in the specification of the earlier patent.”); Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Doll, 561 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“On remand, the district court should determine whether these processes were disclosed before
January 8, 1990, the date of filing of the ’216 process patent.”). In Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
678 F.3d 1280, 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the earlier genus patent was prior art for the subsequent
species patent, which the Federal Circuit analyzed for double patenting. The Federal Circuit said “[T]he
patent principally underlying the double patenting rejection need not be prior art.” Id. at 1297. This article
does not address these apparent inconsistencies.
315
Lisa A. Dolak & Michael L. Goldman, Responding to Prior Art Rejections – An Analytical
Framework, 83 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (2001); Kirk M. Hartung, ‘Prior Art’: The Undefined
Key to Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 704–05 (1952).
316
Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
317
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
318
Dolak, supra note 316, at 5 (discussing pre-AIA § 102).
319
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (pre-AIA) (“A person shall not be entitled to a patent unless (a) the
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .”). As discussed
below in Part V, the AIA changes both what constitutes an art reference and when an art reference is prior
art.
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¶99

Even though patents are expressly mentioned in § 102(a) pre-AIA) as a category of
prior art, there are a number of situations in which an earlier patent might not constitute
“prior art” to a pending patent application, particularly when the applicant for the second
patent is the same person as the holder of the earlier patent.320 After all, it would be
impossible for an inventor to disclose her invention (in a printed publication or
anywhere) “before the invention” as required in § 102(a) (pre-AIA).321 Professors Merges
and Duffy wrote that “only a third party can create novelty problems under § 102(a),
whereas anyone—including the inventor . . . —can create prior art that serves as a
statutory bar under 1952 Act §102(b),”322 which only requires public disclosure or use
more than a year before the patent application. The predecessor court to the Federal
Circuit, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), said, “Absent a statutory bar
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (c), or (d), applicant’s own invention cannot be ‘prior art’ to
him.”323
¶100
In short, pre AIA there are art references in existence that may not constitute prior
art. The double patenting doctrine fills a potential gap in preventing persons from
circumventing the technicalities of prior art and obtaining two patents on the same
invention.324
3. What person must hold the patents

¶101

In Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc.,325 the Federal Circuit said, “The
double patenting doctrine ‘precludes one person from obtaining more than one valid
patent for either (a) the ‘same invention,’ or (b) an ‘obvious’ modification of the same
invention.”326 The language in Otsuka - “one person from obtaining” - and the language
in both pre-AIA and AIA §101 - “Whoever invents . . . is entitled to a patent” - indicate
that the inventor of both patents should be the same. Indeed, under §102(pre-AIA),
Professor Merges explains, “If the second application were filed by a different inventor, .

320
The AIA changed the timing for judging whether an art reference was “prior” from “before the
invention” in § 102(a) ()(pre-AIA) to “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention” in
§ 102(a)(1) and (2) ()(post-AIA). As a result, certain disclosures by the inventor which might not be prior
art pre-AIA can be prior art post-AIA. This article discusses the significance of that change in Part V.
321
Other categories of prior art in § 102(pre-AIA) similarly refer to “before the invention by the
applicant for patent” and “before such invention.” See § 102(e)(pre-AIA) and § 102(g) ()(pre-AIA).
322
Merges, supra note 6, at 341, n.2.
323
In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300, n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The court added, “However, applications
having the same inventor and claiming the same invention are subject to rejection for double patenting. In
contrast, if the inventors are different, no such rejection can be made; rather, an interference is in order.” Id.
Under § 102(b), an inventor loses her right to a patent if her invention was in “public use” or “on sale” in
this country for more than one year prior to the patent application. Under § 102(c), an inventor loses her
right to an invention if she has abandoned her invention. Under AIA § 102(d), an inventor loses her right to
a patent if “the invention was patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an inventor’s
certificate, by the applicant . . . in a foreign country . . . filed more than twelve months before the filing of
the application in the United States.”
324
Crouch, Splitting Ownership, supra note 315.
325
Otsuka Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
326
Id. at 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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. . The PTO would declare an interference and then apply the priority rules in §102(g) to
determine which inventor was entitled to the patent.”327
¶102
The principle of one individual inventor328 obtaining only one patent for the same
invention does not address in what circumstances double patenting may arise when there
are joint inventors. The prevailing view is that double patenting can exist when there is
one common individual inventor among the inventors listed in the two patents.329 First of
all, in Miller, although it was not necessarily talking about joint inventors, the Supreme
Court said that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent,
especially to the same patentee,”330 which suggests that double patenting might be
present when the patentees are not the same.331 In In re Hubbell,332 the Federal Circuit
expressly found double patenting applicable when there were multiple inventors for both
patents and only one common inventor for the two patents.333 As reflected in the next
section, however, there are some decisions seemingly in tension with Hubbell.334
¶103
The more significant practical question for pharmaceutical companies may be what
happens when the individual employees are the inventors, and the company is the
assignee for either both patents or the patent and patent application.335 Professor Merges
and Duffy say that under the CREATE Act,336 discussed below, obviousness type double
patenting “can arise where the two patents have different inventors but the same
327

Merges, supra note 6, at 1145.
The inventor is the individual “who has exerted the creative mental effort in the act of
invention.” 3 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 10:13 (4th ed. 2013)..
329
35 U.S.C. § 116(a) provides, “When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they
shall apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this title.
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the
same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.”
330
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 198 (1894) (emphasis added).
331
Id.; supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
332
In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
333
Id. at 1147 (“Based on the foregoing, although Hubbell argues that we should create a specific
exception barring application of obviousness-type double patenting in instances where the conflicting
claims share only common inventors, rather than common ownership, we see no valid basis for doing so.”).
MPEP § 804¶I.A now provides, “Double patenting may exist between an issued patent and an application
filed by the same inventive entity, a different inventive entity having a common inventor, a common
applicant, . . . ,” citing Hubbell.
334
See, e.g., In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) ; infra notes 365–72 and 423–28 and accompanying text.
335
Professor Merges has explained that this is a typical situation, with the employees having initial
rights to the patents, but with contractual obligations to assign such patents to the employer. See Robert P.
Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5-10 (1999).
336
See H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 5–6 (2004) (“Congress intends that subject matter developed by
another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section
102 of title 35, and a claimed invention shall be deemed to be owned by the same person, or subject to an
obligation of assignment to the same person where specific conditions are satisfied. The Act achieves this
by eliminating the use of certain information and prior art in obviousness determinations in the
circumstances addressed in the legislation. . . . The doctrine of ‘obviousness-type double patenting,’ a
judicial doctrine used by courts to prevent patentees from obtaining an unjustifiable extension of the
amount of time to exercise a patent’s right to exclude, shall apply to such patents. . . . Congress intends that
parties who seek to benefit from this Act to waive the right to enforce any patent separately from any
earlier patent that would otherwise have formed the basis for an obviousness-type double patenting
rejection.”).
328
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assignee.”337 They explained that “while § 103(c) [pre-AIA] allows a firm to obtain
patents on obvious variations created by different researchers, the courts have still
invoked the double patenting rule to ensure that the two patent terms expire
simultaneously.”338 They added that as a result, the “double patenting doctrine is growing
more important to large research corporations.”339
¶104
There have been four iterations of what initially was 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (pre-AIA).
The first of these four iterations was a response to a 1973 decision of the CCPA that an
earlier invention by an employee that only satisfied § 102(g) (pre-AIA)340 in interference
proceedings could also be cited as prior art to invalidate as obvious the patent claim of a
subsequent invention made by a different employee of the same company.341 As a result,
in 1984 Congress amended § 103(c) (pre-AIA) and “effectively gave corporations the
right to patents on obvious variants of in-house efforts qualifying as prior invention under
35 U.S.C. 102(f) or (g)” (pre-AIA).342 In the second iteration, as part of the American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, § 103(c) (pre-AIA) “was further modified to include
commonly owned prior art under 102(e) (pre-AIA) . . . (i.e., disclosures in earlier-filed
patents or published patent applications of ‘another’) in the list of categories of prior art
that ‘shall not preclude patentability’ under § 103” (pre-AIA).343
¶105
In the third iteration of § 103(c) (pre-AIA), Congress passed the CREATE Act,
which excluded from the obviousness determination information generated by parties to a
joint research agreement involving the inventor only if it qualified as prior art under
§§ 102(e) (pre-AIA) (information disclosed in earlier-filed published patent applications
of “another” person as of the date of the application), 102(f) (information derived from
another) and 102(g) (pre-AIA) (private inventive activity of another).344The House
337
Merges, supra note 6, at 1145. The question of how to treat two patents with different inventors
but the same assignee is not a new issue. See John F. Witherspoon, So-Called Common Assignee Double
Patenting – an Issue in Search for a Home, 4 APLA Q. J. 329, 349 (1976) (“Co-assigned different inventor
entity cases, particularly where joint activity of co-workers is involved, present a unique problem requiring
special attention. . . . Legislative response to this increasingly complex problem is an idea whose time has
come.”). Thanks to Charles L. Gholz for pointing out this article.
338
Merges &Duffy, supra note 6, at 1146.
339
Id.
340
In In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the CCPA interpreted § 102(g) to mean
“the use of the prior invention of another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it under the
circumstances of this case which include the disclosure of such invention in an issued patent, is available as
‘prior art’ within the meaning of that term in § 103 by virtue of § 102(g).” Section 102(g) applied to a
patent application when there had been prior non-public use in the United States by another party of the
same invention as the claimed in the patent application. Nard, supra note 43, at 290–91. The AIA
eliminated § 102(g) and substituted a provision for prior user rights in post-AIA § 273. Id. at 297–99.
341
See also Mueller, supra note 3, at 287.
342
Id. at 290. Section 102(f)
represented the “central principle” that a person cannot simply
copy someone else’s invention and obtain a patent for it. The AIA eliminated § 102(f), but not that central
principle. Id. at 219. The 1984 amendment added the following language to § 103: “Subject matter
developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsections (f) or (g) of section 102 of
this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed
invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation
of assignment to the same person.” Id. at 289.
343
Id. at 290. The AIPA provided in § 4807(a), “Section 103(c) of title 35, United States Code, is
amended by striking ‘subsection (f) or (g)’ and inserting ‘one or more of subsections (e), (f) and (g).” See
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999)
344
See H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, supra note 337, at 5. As a result of the CREATE Act, § 103(c)(1)
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Report accompanying the CREATE Act explained Congress intended that the courts
apply the double patenting prohibition in place of consideration of such disclosures in
determining obviousness.345 That Report also said, “Congress intends that parties who
seek to benefit from this Act to waive the right to enforce any patent separately from any
earlier patent that would otherwise have formed the basis for an obviousness-type double
patenting rejection.”346
¶106
In the fourth iteration of § 103(c), as part of the AIA, Congress moved what had
been § 103(c) (pre-AIA) to § 102(b)(2)(C) (post-AIA), so what had been only a limitation
on what a court could consider for purposes of determining obviousness also became a
limitation on what references a court could consider in determining both novelty and
obviousness.347 Section 102(b)(2) (post-AIA) provides that a disclosure shall not be
considered prior art if “(C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not
later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same
person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.”348 In addition,
§ 102(c) (post-AIA) provides that § 102(b)(2) (post-AIA) is satisfied if: “(1) the subject
matter disclosed was developed and the claimed invention was made by, or on behalf of,
1 or more parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention; (2) the claimed invention was made as a
result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement; and (3)
the application to patent the claimed invention discloses or is amended to disclose the
names of the parties to the joint research agreement.”349 As a result, parties can “enter
into joint-research agreements in order to exclude previous patent disclosures as prior art,
even after they have developed the second invention, as long as no patent application has
yet been filed for the second invention.”350
¶107
Significantly, the AIA also effectively gave the force of law to the CREATE Act
legislative history on double patenting through an uncodified part of the AIA.351
Specifically, AIA § 3(b)(2) provides, “The enactment of section 102(c) of title 35, United
States Code, under paragraph (1) of this subsection is done with the same intent to
promote joint research activities that was expressed, including in the legislative history,
provided, “Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more
of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section
where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made,
owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.” Pub. L. No. 108453, 118 Stat. 3596 (2004).
345
H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, supra note 337, at 6. That Report cited four decisions of the CCPA and
Federal Circuit as examples of double patenting, without any suggestion that these examples were the
extent of the double patenting prohibition, and preceded the decisions with the phrase, “See, e.g.” Id. One
of the decisions in that Report cited Miller as authority for the double patenting prohibition. See In re
Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Miller).
346
H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, supra note 337, at 6.
347
Mueller, supra note 3, at 268–69; Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America
Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B. J. 465, 487 (2012).
348
35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (post-AIA); Mueller, supra note 3, at 269.
349
§ 102(c) (post-AIA); Mueller, supra note 3, at 269; Matal, supra note 348, at 487.
350
Matal, supra note 348, at 487.
351
Id. at 486; Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 3(b)(2) (2011). In light of the “transfer” of
§ 103(c) (pre-AIA) to § 102 (post-AIA) and its application to both obviousness and novelty, see supra, note
348, it is not clear why the same conclusion would not also apply to same invention double patenting.
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through the enactment of the . . . ‘CREATE Act.’” AIA § 3(b)(2) further directs that the
“United States Patent and Trademark Office shall administer section 102(c) of title 35,
United States Code, in a manner consistent with the legislative history of the CREATE
Act that was relevant to its administration by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.”352
¶108
Professor Crouch, before the adoption of the AIA, concluded that “an obviousness
type double patenting rejection requires a link between the two applications—either in
terms of inventorship or ownership.”353 Similarly, MPEP § 804.II.B provides that
obviousness type double patenting can arise when the two patents or patent applications
are commonly owned or subject to a joint research agreement. Of course, the
determinations made on whether the same person is holding two patents can raise
difficult questions (such as whether affiliated corporations are the same entity), and no
legal standard is without grey areas.354
¶109
Where the Federal Circuit has significantly—and inconsistently—restricted the
double patenting prohibition stated by the Supreme Court in Miller, it equates the
invention with the boundary of the claims rather than considering all embodiments
disclosed by the specification and claims.
4. Federal Circuit has eviscerated and ruled inconsistently on double patenting
¶110

The Federal Circuit has eviscerated the double patenting doctrine and ruled
inconsistently with predecessor courts by determining the invention from the “boundary”
of the claims rather than the embodiments disclosed by the specification and claims. In
contrast, the Supreme Court cases in the 1800s compared the inventions described in the
specifications, even after the practice of peripheral claiming had commenced.355
¶111
Due to the importance of the Patent Act of 1952, this article next reviews a number
of appellate decisions since the Patent Act of 1952 and explains that there is no basis for
concluding that the Patent Act of 1952 changed the meaning of the term “invention.”
This review discloses that the Federal Circuit has disregarded not only Miller but some
earlier appellate cases and improperly changed double patenting from (a) a principle
under § 101to prevent patent holders from extending exclusive rights over some of the
same embodiments in successive patents into (b) only an alternate obviousness analysis

352

America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2)
Crouch, Splitting Ownership, supra note 315. Section 102(c) (post AIA) provides: Subject
matter disclosed and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person or
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person in applying the provisions of subsection (b)(2)(C)
if:(1) the subject matter disclosed was developed and the claimed invention was made by, or on behalf of, 1
or more parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention; (2) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope
of the joint research agreement; and (3) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is
amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement.”
354
See, for instance, the discussion of Sarett and Kaplan, infra at notes 365366–73 and 424–29
and accompanying text.
355
Supra, Part IVA, notes 248–302 and accompanying text.
353
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under § 103 (pre-AIA) comparing the boundaries of the claims rather than the
embodiments disclosed in the specifications.356
¶112
A few years after the adoption of the Patent Act of 1952, in Weatherhead Co. v.
Drillmaster Supply Co.,357 the Seventh Circuit358 held that if a person received a genus
patent and subsequently received a species patent within the scope of the patented genus,
the second patent constituted prohibited double patenting.359 Weatherhead was an
infringement suit involving two patents to the same inventor for metal packing
rings/joints.360 The earlier issued,361 more general ‘413 patent applied to “material
sufficiently hard to shear said tube and [] sufficiently ductile to be radially contracted.”362
The more specific claims in the subsequent ‘217 patent were for rings “made of low
carbon steel which has been surface hardened by means of a potassium cyanide bath.”363
The Seventh Circuit found, “No one could manufacture the device claimed in ‘217
without infringing ‘413,” so held that “the appellants are guilty of double patenting and
their second patent (No. 2,171,217) is invalid.”364 In other words, the Seventh Circuit
held—consistent with the position taken in this article—that the ‘217 patent for a species
within the scope of the earlier genus patent granted to the same inventor constituted
improper double patenting.
¶113
In 1964, in contrast, the CCPA held there was no double patenting in In re
Sarett,365an often cited case involving a genus and subsequent species patent, which did
not involve the same inventors. Related, but not identical parties filed on the same day
356
This article does not contest using § 101 as an alternate obviousness analysis under § 103
(either pre-AIA or post-AIA) when there is no prior art, but contends the double patenting prohibition is
more than just a check on obviousness in those situations. The double patenting prohibition highlighted in
different ways in Morse, Miller, and Singer, supra notes 1–2, 146–53, 271–302 and 25–27, is also a check
on attempts by the inventor or his employer after the genus patent to gain longer exclusive rights over parts
of the genus.
357
227 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1955).
358
Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the applicable federal regional circuit court
of appeals heard appeals in patent infringement cases. In 1982, all appeals from patent cases were
consolidated in the newly created Federal Circuit. Mueller, supra note 3, at 40, 47–48.
359
227 F.2d at 102.
360
Id. at 99–100. Apparently the earlier issued patent was not considered prior art because the two
patents were by the same inventor, Kreidel, and the applications leading to the patents had been copending
for some period of time. Id. There are seemingly inconsistent decisions on the effect of copending
applications by the same inventor. Compare General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972
F.2d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Neither is statutory ‘prior art’ to the other because the patent
applications were copending and, further, because there can be no “prior invention by another ” (cf. 35
U.S.C. § 102(g)) because both are the inventions of Zosel.”); In re Coleman, 189 F.2d 976, 978 (C.C.P.A.
1951) (“Since these patents were copending with the appealed application they do not constitute technical
prior art references but are to be looked to only for what they claim”); In re Fong, 378 F.2d 977, 980
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (“We must reject the premise that common ownership and copendency in themselves
necessarily preclude consideration of a patent as a part of the prior art.”)
361
The ‘413 patent was issued on December 6, 1938, and the ‘217 patent was issued on August
29, 1939. Id. at 99.
362
Id. at 101, citing claim 11 of the ‘413 patent. See also U.S. Patent No. 2,139,413 pp.3, ll, 29–31
(filed Oct 25, 1933).
363
227 F.2d at 100. See also U.S. Patent No. 2,171,217, pp. 3, ll, 17–18, 26–27 (filed Aug 17,
1937).
364
227 F.2d at 102 (emphasis added).
365
In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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what became the Arth patent and what was the Sarett application.366 Also, although there
was a genus patent and a subsequent species patent application, the species patent claim
was not clearly within the scope of the earlier genus.367 One claim of the Arth patent
contained “a broad, functional, generic expression,” for oxidizing alcohols,368 but that
claim also included additional process limitations369 not included in the Sarett
application.370 The court said that “we are concerned only with what this patent
claims”371 in determining the invention and found that the difference in the claims were
“were more than enough to convince us that ‘patentable distinction’ exists” between the
claims of the Sarett Application and the Arth Patent.372 Although Sarett shows that the
CCPA only considered the claims rather than embodiment, because the case involves
related, but not identical parties, it does not constitute precedent against the argument in
this article that a genus patent to one inventor and a subsequent application for a species
patent within the scope of the genus to the same inventor constitutes improper double
patenting.
¶114
In 1966 in In re Walles,373 the CCPA essentially removed same invention type
double patenting when it held that claimed subject matter in two patents (or a patent and
patent application) had to be identical for there to be double patenting, in spite of the
Supreme Court’s statement in Miller that there could be the same invention even though
“the terms of the claim may differ.”374 Walles involved a rejected claim defining a resin
per se and an earlier patent for a hair setting composition which contained the resin
identified in the claims of the later patent, and applicants who were the same as the
holders of the earlier patent.375 The court said that the “term same ‘invention’ is too broad
a term to fit in with the law of double patenting, because of the diversity of meanings of
‘invention,’” quoting not Supreme Court cases but a 1933 text for authority.376 The
CCPA explained, “We may not ignore or discard any portions of the claimed subject
366
One application was filed by appellant Sarett (the Sarett application) and one application
(which became a patent) was filed jointly by Arth, Poos and Sarett (the Arth patent). Id. at 1010. Since the
Sarett application and what became the Arth Patent were filed on the same day in 1951, neither application
nor the patent could have been prior art. Id. at 1007.
367
The court noted, “No simple relationship exists between the claims of Arth et al. and appellant's
claims. Some of appellant's claims are more specific, some more generic to those of Arth et al. Some are
hybrid.” Id. at 1012.
368
Id. at 1005, 1009.
369
Id. at 1008, 1010.
370
Id. at 1010 (“We will not at this point go into the reasoning of the Patent Office, which in
essence asks us to ignore specific process step limitations in the patent claims on the ground that they are
‘conventional’ steps.”). Also, compare claim 8 of the Sarett Application, id. at 1006, with claim 9 of the
Arth Patent, id. at 1008.
371
Id. at 1007.
372
Id. at 1016. The court cited these differences in the claim rather than considering the
embodiments disclosed in the specification: “each of the appealed claims defines an oxidation with Sarett’s
specific oxidizing agent followed by a conventional ‘recovery’ of any desired and undefined kind. Patent
claims 10 and 12 by contrast define five-step processes involving isomerization of one of the recovered
products as in the case of claim 11, fully discussed above.” Id.
373
In re Walles, 366 F.2d 786, 791–92 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
374
151 U.S. at 198.
375
366 F.2d at 787–88. The rejected application resulted from a division of a parent case, from
which the patent was also based, so the earlier patent was not prior art. Id. at 787.
376
Id. at 789 (quoting STRINGHAM ON DOUBLE PATENTING).
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matter.”377 The court added it had “to determine independently precisely what subject
matter is defined in the two sets of claims,” disregarding the specifications.378
¶115
Seeming to suggest—incorrectly—that case law on double patenting before the
Patent Act of 1952 was irrelevant, the CCPA in Walles said, “Whatever meaning the term
‘invention’ may have possessed prior to the 1952 Patent Act, it is clear that the term
‘invention’ now means the subject matter which the applicant claims and regards as his
‘invention.’”379 Subsequent Federal Circuit cases have similarly limited same-invention
type double patenting to identically claimed subject matter.380 As set forth above,
however, after the passage of the Patent Act of 1952, the Supreme Court in Pfaff
recognized that the “invention” arose before and independently of the claim, so the Patent
Act of 1952 did not limit “invention” to the claim. 381 Moreover, the Federal Circuit in
such cases as Ariad limited the patentable invention to the scope of the invention
disclosed in the specification.382 Finally, the sparse legislative history in the Patent Act of
1952 did not suggest any change in the definition of “invention.”383
¶116
Under the narrow standard in Walles, a skilled draftsman could avoid a same
invention type double patenting challenge to a second patent application by adding a
minor limitation to a claim, or in other words, by slightly narrowing the scope of the
original patent.384 Only considering the claims as the invention effectively makes same
invention type double patenting a dead letter. In Ariad, the Federal Circuit rejected the
idea that claims reflected the invention, saying “the principal function of claims” is “to
provide notice of the boundaries of the right to exclude and to define limits; it is not to
describe the invention.”385 In contrast, the “written description discloses and teaches.”386

377
Id. . The court held there was no double patenting and reversed the rejection of the patent
application, saying, “Based on the facts of record, we know no theory of law concerning ‘double patenting’
which permits us to find that the inventions are ‘patentably indistinct.’” Id. at 791–92.
378
Id. at 789.
379
366 F.2d at 714.
380
See, e.g., Sun Pharm. Ind., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
381
Supra note 177–80 and accompanying text.
382
598 F.3d at 1349. The applicant could draft a claim narrower than the scope disclosed in the
invention. See also notes 162 and 171 above.
383
Section 100(a) (pre-AIA) contained the following definition: “The term ‘invention’ means
invention or discovery.” 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1952) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 100 (2012)). The Senate
Report explained, “Paragraph (a) is added only to avoid repetition of the phrase ‘invention or discovery’
and its derivatives throughout the revised title.” S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 16 (1952). Also, the Senate Report
explained the two clauses in § 112 mentioning invention as follows: “The clause relating to the claim is
made a separate paragraph to emphasize the distinction between the description and the claim or definition,
and the language is modified.” Id. at 19. This suggests an intent to consider the description in the
specification in addition to the claim. As a result of the AIA, § 101(j) (post-AIA) now provides, “The term
‘claimed invention’ means the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or an application for a patent.”
21 U.S.C. § 100 (2012). This seems to confirm that the claim shows what the inventor claims is its
invention, whereas the specification must disclose what the invention is.
384
The Supreme Court has cautioned against an interpretation of patent law that leaves it open to
the vagaries of skilled drafters. See, e.g., note 33 above.
385
598 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added).
386
Id.
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It naturally follows that any embodiment of a claimed genus disclosed in the specification
made by a third party is an infringing species of the patented invention.387
¶117
In 1970, in Tidewater Patent Development Co. v. K.M. Kitchen,388 the Fourth
Circuit took the approach of the Seventh Circuit in Weatherhead, in finding the
applicable patent invalid for double patenting because the same party had received a
patent for a genus and subsequent patent for a species within the scope of the genus.389
Tidewater involved two patents for a permanent hair waving solution issued from
applications which had been copending.390 Tidewater was the holder of both patents,391
and the court noted that, if upheld, “such repetitive patenting would extend the
effectiveness of 710 from its expiry in December 1968 to 323’s terminal date of February
1973.”392 The Fourth Circuit in Tidewater said that double patenting could exist even if
the claims did not mutually “read on” (infringe) each other.393 The ‘710 patent was
“classified as a generic patent relating to hair waving, while ‘323 is designated as a
species patent.”394 The court added, “Proof of double patenting is found in the concession
of Tidewater that any product made under 323 would infringe 710.”395
¶118
The court in Tidewater noted that an earlier patent granted to one party “does not
invalidate a later patent to him for a distinct, different and separable invention whether
generic or specific, whether an original machine or process, or both, or an improvement
thereon which is not actually claimed or secured by the earlier patent.”396 Immediately
preceding this statement, the court in Tidewater explained that an inventor could have
multiple inventions, and the inventor could “secure all these inventions by a single
patent,” referring to multiple claims in a single patent application rather than two patents
or a patent and patent application as discussed in this article.397 On the issue of two
patents, the court in Tidewater concluded that “the species patent must fall if within the
coverage of the genus patent.”398
387

Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55 at 57–58.
371 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 1012–13.
390
One patent application was filed June 16, 1941 and issued on December 4, 1951 as the ‘710
patent; and the other application was filed August 13, 1949 and issued on February 28, 1956 as the ‘323
patent, and thus the patents were copending for some period of time. Id. at 1006. Court decisions on
whether applications that were copending could be prior art have not always been consistent. In General
Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1992), in discussing double
patenting and two patent applications that had been copending, the court said, “[n]either is statutory ‘prior
art’ to the other because the patent applications were copending and, further, because there can be no ‘prior
invention by another’ (cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)) because both are the inventions of Zosel.” On the other
hand, in In re Fong, 378 F.2d 977, 980 (C.C.P.A. 1967), the CCPA said, “We must reject the premise that
common ownership and co-pendency in themselves necessarily preclude consideration of a patent as a part
of the prior art.”
391
371 F.2d at 1006.
392
Id. at 1011.
393
Id. at 1009 (quoting In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225, 229 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (“Double patenting
may exist even where, as here, the claims in two cases are not mutually cross-readable.”)).
394
371 F.2d at 1006.
395
Id. at 1009. The court reversed the finding of infringement. Id. at 1013.
396
Id. at 1010 (quoting Remington Rand BusinessBus. Serv., Inc. v. Acme Card SystemSys. Co.,
71 F.2d 628, 633–34 (4th Cir. 1934)).
397
Id.
398
371 F.2d at 1011.
388
389
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¶119

Chisum argues that the opinion in Tidewater is “contrary to the accepted notion that
an inventor may obtain a patent on a later nonobvious improvement,” citing the statement
by the Supreme Court in Morse: “Nor can its [the second patent to the inventor] validity
be impeached upon the ground that it is an improvement upon a former invention, for
which the patentee had himself already obtained a patent.”399 However, the fact that the
Supreme Court in Morse recognized that an inventor who already held a patent could
obtain a patent for some improvements does not suggest that the inventor could obtain
patents for all improvements. Indeed the paragraph from Morse that Chisum quoted
concluded by saying, “All that the law requires of him is that he shall not claim as new,
what is covered by a former invention, whether made by himself or any other person.”400
¶120
A review of the Supreme Court’s discussion of Morse’s separate patent for local
circuits401 indicates that the patent for an improvement in local circuits was not within the
scope of the earlier invention, 402 so there was no reason Morse could not also patent the
local circuits, since the eighth claim in Morse was invalidated.403 The Court in Morse said
that if the eighth claim (for all uses of electro-magnetism to transport messages over a
distance) could have been sustained, Morse’s subsequent patent for local circuits would
have been “illegal and void.”404 The Court explained that Morse “could not take out a
subsequent patent for a portion of his [eighth claim] . . . and thereby extend his
monopoly beyond the period limited by law.”405 The Court was saying that the same
inventor could not obtain a patent on an improvement to a genus patent if in fact the
inventor’s genus patent was broad enough that it covered the improvement. The decision
in Morse, in other words, is not a basis for challenging the decision in Tidewater.
¶121
In 1968, the CCPA in In re Schneller406 followed the positions of the Seventh
Circuit in Weatherhead and the Fourth Circuit in Tidewater and confirmed the
significance of a person obtaining a patent for a genus and subsequently applying for a
species patent within the scope of the genus.407 The court said that the “fundamental
reason” for the rule against double patenting was “to prevent unjustified timewise
extension of the right to exclude granted by a patent no matter how the extension is
brought about.”408 Schneller argued that his patent claimed ABCX and that his rejected
399

See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.03[2][b][ii], p. 9-35; supra note 46.
56 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added).
Id. at 121, 123 (“A telegraph which prints the intelligence it conveys at different places, by
means of the current, as it passes along on the main line, must necessarily require a different combination
and arrangement of powers from the one that prints only at the end. The elements which compose it may all
have been used in the former invention; but it is evident that their arrangement and combination must be
different to produce this new effect.”)
402
Compare claim 1 (“short local independent circuit or circuits”) and Sheets 1-4 of U.S. Patent
No. 4,453 with claims 1-8 and sheets 1-4 of U.S. Patent No. 1,647.
403
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
404
56 U.S. at 114.
405
Id.
406
In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
407
The patent and rejected claim were for clip systems for securing gypsum lath to supports in
partition walls. Id. at 350–51.
408
Id. at 354. Since there had been a division of the initial application, the court discussed § 121,
which provides that if the USPTO determines that an application contains two or more distinct inventions
and requires the application to be divided into two applications, the first patent granted cannot be cited as
prior art against the second patent, unless they were independent and distinct inventions. Id. The court said,
400
401
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application claimed ABCY.409 The court pointed out, however, that the 1960 Patent had
used “comprising” in the transition.410 The result was that Schneller “obtained a patent
claiming … ABCX, but so claiming these combinations as to cover them no matter what
other feature is incorporated in them, thus covering effectively ABCXY.”411 In other
words, the ‘329 patent was a genus patent due to the use of “comprising,” and the
rejected claims were a species within the scope of the genus. The court took the position
of this article in affirming the rejection of the claim as an example of double patenting,
because the “protection he already had would be extended, albeit i[n] somewhat different
form, for several years beyond the expiration of his patent, were we to reverse.”412
¶122
In 1970 in contrast, in In re Vogel 413 the CCPA set a two-part test for determining
if there was obviousness-type double patenting, which test the Federal Circuit has
subsequently followed414 and which still focuses on a comparison of the boundaries of
the claims rather than determining under Miller whether the earlier patent covered
embodiments claimed in the subsequent species patent.415 The court in Vogel said the first
part of the test was, “Is the same invention being claimed twice?”416 As in Walles,417 the
court in Vogel said that “‘invention’ here means what is defined by the claims.”418 The
court in Vogel then said that the second part of the obviousness-type double patenting test
was: “Does any claim in the application define merely an obvious variation of an
invention disclosed and claimed in the patent?”419 In making that determination, the court
said the disclosure in the earlier patent was not prior art.420 If the second claim was

“The public policy considerations underlying 35 U.S.C. 121 permit separate patents on ‘independent and
distinct’ inventions which are initially ‘claimed in one application.’” Id. However, the court also said that
“no such determination has been made” and added that voluntary separation of claims by the applicant
needed to be scrutinized carefully, “because it can lead to the improper proliferation of patents on the same
invention with the inherent result of extending timewise a patentee's right to exclude others from the
invention disclosed in the original application and on which his patent has issued.” Id.
409
Id. at 354.
410
Id.
411
Id. at 356.
412
Id.
413
In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
414
See In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986); General Foods Corp. v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Hitachi Metals, Ltd., 603 Fed.
App’x 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
415
Vogel involved a patent held by Vogel claiming a method for preparing pork products and a
patent application by Vogel claiming methods for preparing packaged meat products and for preparing beef
products. 422 F.2d at 439–40.
416
Id. at 441.
417
See supra notes 373–79 and accompanying text.
418
422 F.2d at 441. The court added that same invention meant identical subject matter and that an
“invention defined by a claim reciting ‘halogen’ is not the same as that defined by a claim reciting
‘chlorine,’ because the former is broader than the latter.” Id. However, it added that “claims may be
differently worded and still define the same invention,” giving the example of a claim reciting 36 inches
and a claim reciting three feet. Id.
419
Id.
420
The Federal Circuit did say that the embodiment in the specification could be used to determine
the meaning of the words in the claims and could be helpful in deciding if the second claim would have
been obvious, since the specification “sets forth at least one tangible embodiment within the claim, and it is
less difficult and more meaningful to judge whether that thing has been modified in an obvious manner.”
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merely an obvious variation of the first, then there was double patenting and that claim
would be invalid.421
¶123
Since Vogel was decided before Ariad, one question was apparently not raised. As
discussed above, before Ariad a patent claim that was enabled when the application was
filed could be “expanded” at the time of an alleged infringement to cover accused
products that employed after-arising technologies, but not after Ariad.422 The question
today would be, if the species within the genus was not obvious to the applicant at the
time of the filing of the genus claim, how could he have appropriately claimed he had
invented that species at the time of the application for the genus patent? 423
¶124
In 1986, in In re Kaplan,424 shortly after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the
Federal Circuit only considered the claims of the genus patent and patent claims for the
species application (within the scope of the genus) in determining that there was no
double patenting. Kaplan had a patent for a generic catalytic process for producing
certain chemicals,425 and Kaplan and Walker (the Kaplan/Walker application) jointly
filed—while the application that became the Kaplan patent was pending—a patent
application for the preferred mode of practicing the Kaplan patent with a specific organic
solvent.426 Due to the differences in the claims, the court held that “the same invention is
not being claimed” in the Kaplan patent and the Kaplan/Walker application, so the court
concluded there was no double patenting.427 Even if the Federal Circuit in Kaplan had
considered the embodiments in the specifications in determining “invention,” however,
the court might not have concluded there was double patenting, since the purpose of
double patenting is to prevent the same party from extending its exclusive rights through
a second patent.428 The court in Kaplan noted that “a sole inventor and joint inventors
including the sole inventor are separate ‘legal entities,’ a legal proposition from which
certain legal consequences flow.”429 Therefore, Kaplan is not precedent for one
Id. at 442. However, consideration of the specification was only to determine if the second claim was
obvious, not to determine if the earlier genus claim covered the subsequent species claim.
421
Unless the applicant had filed a terminal disclaimer, which could “prevent undue timewise
extension of monopoly.” Id. The last sentence of pre-AIA § 253 provides that “any patentee or applicant
may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the term, of the patent granted
or to be granted.” 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2011). Post-AIA § 253(b) has substantially the same sentence, but there
are certain limitations on when the courts will allow the filing of a terminal disclaimer. See infra note 464.
422
Supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. Also, since the genus claim literally covered the
species, there would be no basis for applying the doctrine of equivalents to cover after-arising technology,
even assuming the second patent was the result of after-arising technology. Supra notes 228–40.
423
The court held that in light of the patent for preparing pork products, the rejected claim for
preparing beef products did not constitute double patenting. Id. at 442. However, the rejected claim for
preparing meat did constitute double patenting in light of the patent for preparing pork products. Id. at 442–
43.
424
In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
425
Id. at 1574–76.
426
Id. at 1575. The application for the Kaplan patent was filed on January 2, 1975 and granted on
March 16, 1976. Id. at 1574. The great-great-grandparent of the Kaplan/Walker application was filed on
September 30, 1975. Id. Both the Kaplan patent and the Kaplan/Walker application were assigned to Union
Carbide Corporation. Id.
427
Id. at 1581.
428
Gilead Sci., Inc., 753 F.3d at 1212.
429
Kaplan, 789 F.2d at 1575. This article argues that the holder of a patent for a genus should be
estopped from obtaining a subsequent patent for a species within the scope of the genus.
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pharmaceutical company obtaining a broad patent on a chemical composition and then
obtaining a patent on a species within the scope of the genus.
¶125
In 2012 and 2014, after its en banc decision in Ariad, one might suspect that the
Federal Circuit would change its understanding of “invention” to give more prominence
to the specification. However, a review of two recent Federal Circuit decisions, discussed
next, reveals that Ariad did not influence the Federal Circuit on double patenting. This
perhaps reflects what Professor Collins has said, that “patent litigation and scholarship
are frequently conducted within distinct doctrinal silos. Courts . . . take on disclosure
issues (section 112, paragraph 1), functional claiming issues (section 112, paragraph 6),
or utility issues (section 101) in isolation, assuming that each doctrine maps onto a
distinct normative problem.”430 Such separation of Ariad’s teaching on § 112 from
Miller’s teaching on § 101 is not warranted.431
i)
¶126

Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc. 432
No double patenting under § 101

In the Federal Circuit Sandoz was unsuccessful in challenging the validity of
Otsuka’s patent for its antipsychotic drug, marketed under the brand name Abilify®.433
Otsuka held U.S. Patent No. 4,734,416 (the ‘416 patent), which issued on March 29,
1988 and covered approximately nine trillion compounds,434 including a broad genus of
compounds that generically encompassed aripiprazole, although aripiprazole was not
specifically disclosed.435 The narrower patent allegedly infringed by the defendants was
U.S. patent No. 5,006,528 (the ‘528 patent), issued on April 9, 1991.436 Claim 12 of the
‘528 patent specifically claimed aripiprazole,437 the active ingredient in Abilify®.438

430
Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of
Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 60, (2010).
431
Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 43, 60 (2012) (“Patent scholars observe a propensity for formalism in the Federal Circuit's patent
jurisprudence. The court depicts patent law as an ordered system founded upon a few abstract, discrete
categories and higher principles. It perceives each of the statutory requirements as a distinct silo, rigidly
adhering to the notion that each substantive doctrine operates separately and independently from the
others.”).
432
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
433
The ‘528 patent received a five year extension of its term under § 156 for the period of the
FDA’s regulatory review. See Certificate Extending Patent Term Under 35 U.S.C. § 156 at p. 14 of U.S.
Patent No. 5,006,528. See also discussion of extension of patent terms under §156 supra at notes 71-75 and
accompanying text. With the five year term extension of the ‘528 patent for Abilify® and a six month
period of pediatric exclusivity, the ‘528 patent was to expire on April 20, 2015. Otsuka, 678 F.3d at 1285.
434
.Otsuka, 678 F.3d. at 1286. The ‘416 patent expired on March 29, 2005. Id. The Federal Circuit
said the ‘416 patent constituted prior art. Id. at 1286. The court also said, “The patent principally
underlying the double patenting rejection need not be prior art.” Id. at 1297.
435
Otsuka Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2010 WL 4596324, *3 (D.N.J. 2010). The briefs of
both parties noted that a claim of the ‘416 patent “covers” or “encompasses” aripiprazole. Id.
436
678 F.3d at 1285. One of the inventors of the ‘416 patent was Yasuo Oshiro, who was also one
of the inventors of the ‘528 patent. See p. 1 of the ‘416 patents.
437
Otsuka, 2010 WL 4596324, at *4 (“Claim 12 of the ‘528 patent is directed to the compound
aripiprazole, which has the chemical name 7–{4–[4–(2,3–dichlorophenyl)–1– piperazinyl]–butoxy}–3,4–
dihydrocarbostyril. (‘528 Patent at col. 19, lines 18–19.)”)
438
678 F.3d at 1284-1285.
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Otsuka’s listing for Abilify® in the FDA's Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations (the “Orange Book”) contained references to both the ‘416
patent and the ‘528 patent as covering aripiprazole.439
¶127
The defendants in Otsuka challenged the ‘528 patent on the grounds of (1)
obviousness under § 103 and (2) obviousness type double patenting for one compound
disclosed in claim 13 of the ‘416 patent.440 On obviousness type double patenting the
Federal Circuit did not seem to consider relevant that the drug claimed in the ‘528 patent
(aripiprazole) was within the scope of the genus claim of the ‘416 patent, or that Otsuka
had listed both the ‘416 patent and ‘528 patent in the Orange Book as covering
aripiprazole.441
¶128
Instead, the Federal Circuit agreed with Otsuka and said, “In the context of claimed
chemical compounds, an analysis of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting—
like an analysis under § 103—entails determining, inter alia, whether one of ordinary
skill in the art would have had reason or motivation to modify the earlier claimed
compound to make the compound of the asserted claim with a reasonable expectation of
success.”442 Under this test, a modified obviousness test under § 103, the Federal Circuit
was only comparing the genus claim limits with the subsequent species claim limits.443
¶129
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court that there was no
obviousness type double patenting, because “the prior art would not have provided a
skilled artisan with a reason to make the necessary structural changes to the unsubstituted
butoxy to yield aripiprazole.”444 The court explained that “the evidence here not only
demonstrates the unpredictability of minor structural changes on a compound’s
antipsychotic properties, but also indicates that the prior art would not have provided the
439

Otsuka, 2010 WL 4596324 at *2.
Id. at **8-28 (obviousness) and **28-29 (obviousness type double patenting). A review of the
appellate briefs filed in the Federal Circuit reveals that the defendants did not claim the ‘416 patent
anticipated the ‘528 patent. See 2011 WL 4735195 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 4735196 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL
3796762 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 3796763 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 1748636 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 1748637
(C.A. Fed.), 2012 WL 3597032 (C.A. Fed.), 2012 WL 2450061 (C.A. Fed.).
441
These facts were apparent in the decision, see supra notes 433-438, but the reasoning of the
court, discussed in the next paragraph, disregarded these facts that point to double patenting.
442
678 F.3d at 1298. In Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
Supreme Court held that the “ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,” but identified “several
basic factual inquiries: the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.”
Id. at 17. The Court added, “Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of
the subject matter sought to be patented.” Id. at 17–18. In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007), the Supreme Court discussed how to weigh the various considerations for the obviousness inquiry
set forth in Graham, focusing on predictability of results. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and
Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 391, 425, 393 (2014).
See also Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test For New Pharmaceutical Compounds:
Gobbledygook?, 14 CHI.-. KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 49 (2015); Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious Confusion Over
Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015).
443
678 F.3d at 1297 (It “is the claims that are compared when assessing double patenting”
(quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
444
678 F.3d at 1299. The Federal Circuit in Otsuka also affirmed the district court’s conclusion
that defendants failed to prove that the ‘528 patent claims at issue were obvious under § 103. See id. at
1290–96.
440
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skilled artisan with a reason to make the necessary structural changes to the unsubstituted
butoxy to yield aripiprazole.”445
¶130
In other words, the Federal Circuit was not taking into account the principle in
Miller that “no patent [the ‘528 patent] can issue for an invention actually covered by a
former patent [the ‘416 patent], especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the
claims may differ.”446 Similarly, the Federal Circuit was not considering the Supreme
Court’s statement in Morse that a patentee “could not take out a subsequent patent for a
portion of his first invention [the part of the invention covered by the ‘416 patent], and
thereby extend his monopoly [for aripiprazole] beyond the period limited by law.”447
These historic principles remain valid today and also reflect the recent emphasis of the
Supreme Court and patent law scholarship that patent law must achieve a balance
between First Inventors and Improvers to promote competition for improvements.448
¶131
The extension of the exclusive rights in Otsuka was clear, since the ‘528 patent was
to expire on April 20, 2015, compared to the earlier expiration of the ‘416 patent on
March 29, 2005.449 Otsuka had received the genus ‘416 patent, so the ‘416 patent was
presumed to be valid under § 282. Under Ariad and Novozymes it should have been
presumed that Otsuka had disclosed in the specification for the ‘416 patent sufficient
species to support the scope of the claims, including the species on which Otsuka
subsequently sued on the ‘528 patent.450 In Odiorne, Justice Story concluded that the
earlier patent was “an estoppel to any future patent for the same invention,”451 and under
§ 271(a) the patented invention includes any completed embodiment containing the
elements of the patent claim.452
¶132
Otsuka should have been estopped from subsequently arguing in defense of its ‘528
patent that it wasn’t obvious and that it really hadn’t conceived of the species in the ‘528
patent, especially since Otsuka listed in the Orange Book that both the ‘416 and ‘528
patents covered aripiprazole. Under prosecution history estoppel, parties are estopped
from narrowing the scope of their claims to avoid prior art and obtain a patent and
subsequently trying to recover that abandoned scope against a defendant in infringement
litigation through a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.453 Just as
they do for prosecution history estoppel and assignor estoppel, the courts should reject
the approach of a company obtaining a broad patent through its representation that it had
invented the genus and subsequently obtaining a narrower patent on species within the
scope of the genus patent by arguing that it had not really invented or possessed that
species when it applied for the genus patent.454
445
Id. at 1299. Earlier in the decision the Federal Circuit said that the parties had agreed that the
‘416 patent was prior art to the ‘528 patent. Id. at 1286.
446
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894).
447
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1853).
448
Supra, notes 49-60.
449
678 F.3d at 1285–86.
450
For Ariad, see supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text; for Novozymes, see supra notes
205-12 and accompanying text, and for the presumption of validity, see supra note 217.
451
18 F. Cas. at 579.
452
Supra notes 181-82.
453
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002);
Nard, supra note 43, at 547–48; and supra notes 219-21.
454
A third party improver is not in the same position, since the third party has not already
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AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology Trust455
Double patenting under §101

¶133

In 2014, in AbbVie the Federal Circuit again only considered the claims and
disregarded the actual invention. The Trust’s two separately filed patents involved
combination therapies to treat rheumatoid arthritis with an antirheumatic drug and an
anti-TNFà456 antibody.457 The genus patent, the‘766 patent, expired on October 8,
2012,458 and the subsequent species patent, the ‘422 patent, was scheduled to expire on
August 21, 2018.459 The genus patent claimed a method for co-administering rheumatoid
arthritis treatment to all individuals in need of such treatment.460 Co-administering was
defined to include concomitant use and adjunctive uses of the medicines.461 The species
patent was directed to treating a smaller group of patients within the genus of patients,
individuals with active need, and called for adjunctive use of the same medicines, one of
the categories of the ‘766 patent for administering the medicines.462
¶134
Focusing on the claims and a modified version of the § 103 obviousness test,463
similar to the test it had set forth in Vogel,464 the Federal Circuit in AbbVie said, “First,
the court ‘construes the claim[s] in the earlier patent and the claim [s] in the later patent
and determines the differences.’ Second, the court ‘determines whether those differences
render the claims patentably distinct.’”465 The court continued, “‘A later claim that is not
submitted an oath to the U.S. Patent Office that it had invented the species within the genus patent.
455
AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology, 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
456
Tumor Necrosis Factor Alpha. Id. at 1369. The “named inventors of the ‘766 and ‘422 patents
discovered that a protein called Tumor Necrosis Factor Alpha (TNFá) is partially responsible for the
inflammation rheumatoid arthritis causes. This discovery led the inventors to research antibodies that block
the TNFá protein.” Id.
457
Id.
458
Id.
459
Id. at 1369. Abbvie was a licensee of the ‘766 patent but refused to enter into a license for the
‘442 patent and sued the Trust for a declaratory judgment that the ‘422 patent was invalid. Id. at 1368.
460
Id. at 1370.
461
Id. at 1371.
462
Id. at 1370.
463
In Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1377, n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
the Federal Circuit said, “The distinctions between obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and non-statutory
double patenting include: 1. The objects of comparison are very different: Obviousness compares claimed
subject matter to the prior art; nonstatutory double patenting compares claims in an earlier patent to claims
in a later patent or application; 2. Obviousness requires inquiry into a motivation to modify the prior art;
nonstatutory double patenting does not; 3. Obviousness requires inquiry into objective criteria suggesting
non-obviousness; nonstatutory double patenting does not.” In AbbVie, the Federal Circuit acknowledged
that part of the obviousness-type double patenting analysis was “analogous to an obviousness analysis
under 35 U.S.C. § 103” (764 F.3d at 1378) but did not discuss or cite either of the two recent major
obviousness decisions by the Supreme Court, Graham and KSR , discussed supra at note 441.
464
Supra notes 410-20 and accompanying text.
465
764 F.3d at 1374. If a patent application would otherwise involve obviousness-type double
patenting, the problem may be solved by the applicant submitting a terminal disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. §
253(b), so that the term of the second patent would end with the termination of the first patent. See, e.g.,
MPEP § 804.III ¶3; Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
However, the Federal Circuit has said, “As a general rule, a terminal disclaimer filed to overcome an
obviousness-type double patenting rejection is effective only where the application and conflicting patent
are commonly owned.” In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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patentably distinct from,’ i.e., ‘is obvious over[ ] or anticipated by,’ an earlier claim is
invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.”466 The court added that “the nonclaim
portion [the specification] of the earlier patent ordinarily does not qualify as prior art
against the patentee.”467
¶135
The Federal Circuit noted that the Trust “admits that the claims of the ‘442 patent
are encompassed by those of the ‘766 patent,”468 or in other words, “the genus claimed in
the ‘766 patent (treating all patients in need thereof) is broader than the species claimed
in the ‘442 patent (treating patients with ‘active disease,’ i.e., particularly sick
patients).”469
¶136
The court said, “It is well-settled that a narrow species can be non-obvious and
patent eligible despite a patent on its genus.”470 However, the court also noted that some
species of a patented genus were not patentable separately from the genus.471 It said that
species were not patentable apart from the genus when the “genus is so limited that a
person of ordinary skill in the art can ‘at once envisage each member of this limited class
. . .”472 In other words, “species are unpatentable when prior art disclosures describe the
genus containing those species such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be
able to envision every member of the class.”473 The Federal Circuit held that since the
‘442 patent did “not claim a species manifesting unexpected results” the ‘442 patent
“would have been obvious over the ‘766 patent.” 474
¶137
In an obviousness analysis the focus on the claims makes sense, because both preAIA and post-AIA, § 103 specifically directs the court’s attention to the subject matter
claimed.475 In contrast, § 101476 directs the court’s attention to the actual invention, such
as a composition of matter. As set forth above,477 in Miller and Ariad the courts looked at
the actual product disclosed in the specification—and not simply the claims—in Miller
under § 101 to determine if one inventor had covered the same invention with two
patents, and in Ariad under § 112 to determine the actual invention of the inventor.
466
467

764 F.3d at 1374.
Id. at 1379 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 689 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed.

Cir. 2012)).
468

764 F.3d at 1370.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1379 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash., 334 F.3d 1264, 1270
(Fed.Cir.2003)); In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1577–78 (Fed.Cir.1986); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1014
(1964); CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.03[2][b][ii].
471
764 F.3d at 1379.
472
Id.
473
Id.
474
Id. at 1381. For critiques of the Federal Circuit’s consideration of unexpected results in
determining obviousness, see Mark A. Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected (Sept. 28, 2015) (Stanford Public
Law, Working Paper No. 2666626), SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2666626; Douglas Rogers, Obvious
Confusion over Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (Fall 2015).
475
Section 103 (pre-AIA) directs the court to determine “if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art . . . would have been obvious.” § 103 (post-AIA) directs the
court to determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious.”
476
Section 101 provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”
477
Supra notes 271-302 and accompanying text for Miller; supra notes 191-204 and
accompanying text for Ariad.
469
470
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The outcome in Abbvie was consistent with the argument in this article that the
double patenting prohibition should prevent a company which has obtained a genus
patent for a pharmaceutical composition from then receiving a patent for a species within
the genus. However, the Federal Circuit relied on the weakened double patenting doctrine
that is essentially an alternate obviousness analysis under § 103(pre-AIA) and can fail to
serve the purpose of the double patenting prohibition—to prevent a patentee from gaining
an unjustified time wise extension of its exclusive rights. If Congress wants to grant
pharmaceutical companies further extensions, Congress should do that rather than the
courts.

IV. SUMMARY
¶139

The Federal Circuit has essentially changed the prohibition in Miller from
consideration of the embodiments disclosed in the specification to only giving
consideration to the boundaries of the claims as an alternate method of applying an
obviousness analysis, generally when the earlier patents were not technically prior art
under § 102.478 This has made it easier for skillful drafters to avoid the prohibition. Only
considering the boundaries of the claims is an implicit rejection of the principle about the
“invention” in Morse, Consolidated Electric, Deepsouth and Ariad. That limited
consideration has allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to extend the statutory period of
exclusivity for their products beyond period specified in 35 U.S.C. 154.479
¶140
If on the day before a genus patent were to expire, the holder of the genus patent
obtained a patent on a species within the genus, it then would have had 40 years (minus
one day) to exclude others from making or using that species, instead of the 20 years
permitted by 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2). Surely this would conflict with the principle the
Supreme Court stated in Miller that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered
by a former patent, especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may
differ,”480 and the principle in Morse that an inventor “could not take out a subsequent
patent for a portion of his first invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the
period limited by law.”481
¶141
Under Ariad482 a party cannot obtain a patent if the specification does not
disclose/support the scope of the patent, and once a patent is granted, that patent is
presumed valid. It is inconsistent for an inventor, or an employer of the inventor, to
defend against a double patenting challenge from a defendant in litigation by arguing that
the inventor of the species patent had not possessed the species when it obtained the
species patent. There should be a finding of double patenting when the species patent is
within the scope of the genus patent and the same party or pharmaceutical company holds

478

Supra notes 431–73 and accompanying text discussing Otsuka and Abbvie.
Subject of course to the statutory adjustments permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) for delays
“due to the failure of the PTO” and extensions permitted under § 156 for delays cause by FDA review.
Supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text; Mueller, supra note 3, at 22–24.
480
Miller, 151 U.S. at 198.
481
Morse, 56 U.S. at 114.
482
And under Morse, Consolidated Electric and Schriber-Scroth, supra notes 146-161 and
accompanying text.
479
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both patents.483 There should not be the same result if an unrelated party obtained the
subsequent species patent, because the unrelated party would not already have submitted
an oath to the Patent Office that it had invented the full scope of the genus.
¶142
The next section argues that although double patenting prohibition is an obscure
doctrine, there will be an increased need for a strengthened double patenting doctrine in
AIA cases, because of two loopholes that give companies an incentive to remove certain
references as prior art and/or not disclosing preferred embodiments of the genus.

V. THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT INCREASES THE NEED IN SOME RESPECTS FOR A
STRENGTHENED DOUBLE PATENTING DOCTRINE
¶143

The AIA changes “prior art” in a number of ways. For instance, it changes the date
for determination of whether an art reference is “prior” art from the date of the invention
to the effective filing date of the patent application.484 This in turn means that some
disclosures of an inventor which pre-AIA were not prior art (because the inventor could
not disclose the invention before its invention) could in the future be prior art (since the
inventor could disclose the invention after its invention but before the filing of a patent
application for the invention) and cause a patent to be rejected for anticipation or
obviousness. However, in addition to changing the date on which “prior art” is
determined, the AIA creates a number of exceptions to prior art for a variety of
disclosures by the inventor. 485
¶144
Since the courts have normally only applied double patenting when the earlier
patent was not prior art,486 and the AIA changes what constitutes prior art, there has been
discussion about the need for the double patenting doctrine once more cases apply the
post-AIA patent statutes.487 Professor Crouch has said, “[a]t the margins there continues
483
Of course, no legal standard is without ambiguities. It might be argued that trying to determine
whether a subsequent species patent was within the scope of an earlier genus patent would be too
complicated, but that is a difficult argument to make convincingly. First, the Ariad standard already
requires a comparison of the disclosure in the specification to the claim. Second, under the strengthened
definiteness § 112 standard of Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014), the
Supreme Court has held that patent claims “read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history” must “inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention.” Even under the former definiteness standard, the courts appeared to be able to answer that
question without any uncertainty. In Otsuka, for instance, the district court indicated that the briefs of both
parties had noted the claims of the species patent fell within the scope of the genus patent. 2010 WL
4596324, *3. Similarly, in AbbVie, the Federal Circuit said that the Trust admitted the claims of the genus
‘766 patent were within the scope of the subsequent species patent. 764 F.3d at 1370.
484
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)(2) (post-AIA).
485
Dennis Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA? (September 23,
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/obviousness-patenting-survive.html (accessed Dec. 26, 2015)
(such as “disclosures originating from the inventors (Section 102(b)); as well as prior patent applications
from the same patent-owne[r] and that were still unpublished by the latter filing date (Section
102(b)(2)(c).”).
486
Supra Part IV(B)(2), note 316 and accompanying text.
487
Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA?, supra note 485(“What is
unclear is whether the courts will be willing to apply the rewritten statute in a way that eliminates old forms
of prior art that are no longer part of the statute.”); Olga Berson, Challenging Patent Validity Under The
AIA: Strategic And Tactical Considerations When Deciding Whether To Pursue Ex Parte Reexamination

376

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

2017

to be potential for applicants to ‘play games’ with the filing system in order to extend
their effective patent term.”488 However, he added that the “potential is so reduced from
ages past and the statute now defines prior art at such an explicit level of detail that we
leave little room for a judicially created doctrine that further eliminates patents.”489 Yet,
as mentioned above, in the AIA there is now an express statutory basis for obviousness
type double patenting, since (1) the CREATE Act of 2003 expressed the intent of
Congress that obviousness type double patenting prohibition continue and (2) Section
3(b)(2) of the AIA essentially incorporates the CREATE Act intent into the patent
statutes in § 102(c) (post-AIA).490 There has been no suggestion that the prohibition on
same invention type double patenting would change, since that is based on § 101, and §
101 has not changed under the AIA.491
¶145
There are at least two areas impacted by the AIA that increase the need for the
strengthened double patenting doctrine argued for in this article. The first is the
expansion of the ability of pharmaceutical companies to remove existing knowledge and
references from the definition of prior art both for purposes of anticipation and
obviousness. The second is the elimination of the “best mode” requirement as “a basis on
which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable .
. .”492
¶146
§ 102(c) (post-AIA) increases the ability of pharmaceutical companies to prevent
existing information from being considered prior art in three ways. First, whereas §
103(c) (pre-AIA) only precluded the information identified in § 103(c) (pre-AIA) from
being considered prior art for purposes of obviousness, under AIA § 102(b)(2) and (c)
(post-AIA), the identified information cannot be considered prior art either for purposes
of obviousness or anticipation.493 Second, whereas under § 103(c) (pre-AIA) the claimed
subject matter and earlier invention had to be commonly owned at the time of the claimed
invention, under § 102(b)(2) and (c) (post-AIA), the claimed subject matter and earlier
invention only have to be commonly owned by the effective filing date of the claimed
invention, which gives the pharmaceutical company additional time to remove that

Or Inter Partes Review As Part Of The Overall Litigation Strategy, Aspatore 6 (November 2012), 2012
WL 6636452, p. 6 (“While the AIA has substantially revised Section 102 and adopted a first-to-file priority
principle for patent claims based on applications filed on or after March 16, 2013, it is commonly held that
‘the AIA maintains the existing principle that an inventor's own work does not constitute prior art unless it
is a public disclosure more than a year before the application filing date’”) (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM, 2
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.03(3)(f)); Matal, supra note 348, at 486 (“One significant feature of the legislative
history of the CREATE Act, effectively given the force of law by section 3(b)(2) of the AIA, is its
assurance that double-patenting rules will apply to patent-disclosure subject matter and claimed inventions
deemed to be commonly owned pursuant to pre-AIA § 103(c). . . . The Committee Report for the original
CREATE Act emphasized that “[t]he doctrine of ‘obviousness-type double patenting,’ a judicial doctrine
used by courts to prevent patentees from obtaining an unjustifiable extension of the amount of time to
exercise a patent's right to exclude, shall apply to such patents [i.e., patents benefiting from the CREATE
Act].”) For the legislative history of the CREATE Act, see supra note 337.
488
Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA?, supra note 485.
489
Id.
490
Supra notes 345–52 and accompanying text.
491
Supra note 172.
492
35 U.S.C. § 282 (b)(3)(A) (post-AIA).
493
Mueller, supra note 3, at 291–92.
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information from prior art.494 Third, post AIA the earlier invention will not be considered
prior art to the claimed subject matter if at the effective filing date of the claimed
invention, the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention were “subject to an
obligation of assignment to the same person.”495 A strengthened double patenting
prohibition will be an important compensating balance for this removal of certain
references as prior art.
¶147
Second, the effective elimination of the best mode requirement may make it routine
for “patentees to attempt to assert both patent rights and trade secret rights for preferred
embodiments of their invention in certain types of cases.”496 Professors Love and Seaman
argue convincingly that this change “provides a strong incentive for inventors to include
in current and future patent applications less detail than in applications prosecuted in
prior decades.”497 They add, “In light of widespread dissatisfaction in the patent
community with the level of disclosure and detail in many patents now in force, . . . any
reform that lowers the disclosure bar is due a heavy dose of skepticism.”498
¶148
Professors Love and Seaman even cite an article from a Baker Botts attorney
alerting clients that “the inventor may still pursue patent protection for his or her
invention, and seek broadly-worded patent claims covering numerous different
implementations, while at the same time maintaining in secret (and thus keeping from the
world) his or her best mode for practicing the invention.”499 Although the article notes
that there would be risk with such an approach that the lowered disclosure might cause a
court to find the disclosure defective,500 the enticement of less disclosure might cause
companies to try such an approach and then subsequently try to patent a narrower species
within the genus if courts do not adopt the strengthened double patenting prohibition
argued for in this article.
¶149
In a number of ways, therefore, the strengthened double patenting prohibition
argued for in this article may be more important post-AIA than pre-AIA.

CONCLUSION
¶150

Patent law should promote innovation and competition not simply for so-called
pioneer inventions such as new chemical compositions, but also for improvements to
those compositions, such as follow-on drugs. Supporting that goal of promoting
competition for improvements, under the double patenting prohibition announced by the
Supreme Court in the 1800s, one inventor should not receive two patents covering the
same invention. Unlike third parties developing an improvement to a patented product,
the First Inventor has already submitted an oath or declaration that she invented the full
494

Id. at 291.
35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (post-AIA).
Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1
(2012). Thanks to Professor Love for pointing this out to me.
497
Id. at 15.
498
Id.
499
Robert L. Maier, The Big Secret of the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. TODAY 20 (Dec.
2011), http://files.bakerbotts.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Maier_DEC11.pdf.
500
Id. at n.9.
495
496
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scope of the invention at the time of filing the application for the genus patent.501 Once
the inventor obtains a genus patent on that composition—after that representation—the
courts should prevent that inventor and her employer from subsequently obtaining a
patent on a species within the genus and further excluding competition. The inventor and
the inventor’s employer should not have a second bite at the apple and more years of
exclusive rights.
¶151
The rapid rise of prices for pharmaceutical products is a national problem
threatening U.S. citizens’ access to life-saving medicines. Returning the double patenting
prohibition to the principles announced by the Supreme Court in the 1800s would be a
welcome return to historic values, an important step in increasing competition for
improvements and a logical step toward constraining the rapid rise in pharmaceutical
prices.
¶152
Additional research is necessary to determine whether a similar estoppel argument
should apply to the anticipation analysis under § 102 (pre-AIA and post-AIA) when an
inventor has obtained a genus patent and subsequently applies for a patent on a species
within the scope of the genus patent, and the genus patent is prior art. Should the inventor
be estopped under § 102 (pre-AIA and post-AIA) from arguing that the genus patent did
not anticipate the species and that she had not really invented the claimed species at the
time of filing the application for the genus patent?

501
See Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming is Criminal (Sept. 7, 2016), Cornell Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 16-35. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836165 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2836165 (“Every patent applicant is required to file an oath swearing that the
applicant is the ‘original inventor’ of the claimed subject matter.”)
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